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Essays in Commodities and Freight Markets 
Chapter 1: 
Structural Changes in Functional Curves: Estimation and Testing 
Abstract: This paper considers the estimation and testing of structural changes in functional 
curves that occurs at an unknown date. The functional principal component analysis is 
applied to the random functional curves, decomposing them into interpretable simple latent 
functions and random scalars. We model the random scalars using a simple autoregressive 
model and test for a change in parameters that occur at an unknown date. This method is 
applied to the crude oil futures market to estimate and date possible structural breaks during 
OPEC announcement periods from 1984 to 2017. 
 
Chapter 2: 
Precautionary Demand and Crude Oil Inventories around OPEC meetings 
Abstract: In this paper, we revisit this age-old research question and examine the impact of 
OPEC announcements on the crude oil market but from another angle: How OPEC 
production quota announcements affect an investor’s optimal storage decisions? We show 
evidence that investors increase their crude oil inventories before the announcement, and 
maintain these excess inventories after the announcement. Consistent with the 
precautionary demand story (see. Kilian 2009), we show that this inventory accumulation 
behavior is due to an increased uncertainty induced by the OPEC meetings independent of 
the current market conditions. On average, cumulative abnormal inventories increased by 
iv 
 
2.9% before the event and continues to maintain at that level after the event. In the hedging 
market, we show evidence that hedgers increase their crude oil short positions by 4% 
during periods of possible OPEC production increases. 
Chapter 3: 
Understanding the Fundamentals of Freight Markets Volatility 
Abstract: Freight rates are highly volatile, and both over time and cross-sectionally, the 
causes of volatility are not so clearly understood. We analyse empirically the drivers of 
freight market volatility by considering a number of macroeconomic and shipping-related 
factors that are known to affect the supply and demand for shipping. Specifically we 
examine their impact on forward freight agreement (FFA) option implied volatilities (IV) 
of different maturities for Capesize and Panamax vessels. We find that the level of IVs is 
affected by the spot FFA rate, the slope of the forward curve, as well as by both demand 
and supply economic factors, especially the former. We also find differences in the impact 
of these factors on short-term versus longer-term implied volatilities. Panel regression 
produces strong validation of the results based on separate Capesize and Panamax 
regressions. There is a very interesting and novel finding that the FFA term structure slope 
has a bilinear impact on IV. In general anticipation of economic growth and higher future 
spot freight prices reduce IV whereas higher uncertainty, anticipation of excess shipping 
capacity may increase IV. For the academic community we investigate for the first time 
the impact of fundamental factors on freight rate volatility and thus provide further intuition 
on the mechanics of freight rate volatility. For practitioners, this study is important to 
discover what are the fundamentals used by expert brokers on the Baltic Exchange in 
shaping their assessments on the indicative option prices. Our results also demonstrate an 
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alternative way of obtaining volatility forecasts, which will be useful for the pricing of 
freight rate opti
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Chapter 1: 
Structural Changes in Functional Curves: Estimation and Testing 
Abstract 
This paper considers the estimation and testing of structural changes in functional curves 
that occurs at an unknown date. The functional principal component analysis is applied to 
the random functional curves, decomposing them into interpretable simple latent functions 
and random scalars. We model the random scalars using a simple autoregressive model 
and test for a change in parameters that occur at an unknown date. This method is applied 
to the crude oil futures market to estimate and date possible structural breaks during OPEC 
announcement periods from 1984 to 2017.    
Keywords: Change Point, Functional Data Analysis, OPEC, Crude Oil, Forward Curves, 
Break dates   
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we proposed a method to test for a structural curve break condition on a 
known event. We made use of advances in curve modeling and functional data reduction 
methods to extract information that lies within the shape of the term structure. Using 
functional principal component analysis, we can characterize variations in the curve 
movements such as the flatten or steepening of the curve, level shifts and the “humping” 
of the curve, into variations in three one-dimensional random variables.  In particular, we 
can document breaks in the curve during opec announcement period for the crude oil 
market. 
The literature on the impact by OPEC on the crude oil market is mixed, and ours is the first 
to document the impact of OPEC quota announcements on to the shape of the futures price. 
The contribution of this paper as follows: First, we developed a method to test and estimate 
functional curve break points conditional on a known event. Second, our method allows 
the curve to break in either one of the following components (level, slope or curvature) or 
more than one of them and even allowing them to break at different time points. Third, we 
empirically found some evidence that the crude oil futures curve does break during OPEC 
announcement periods suggesting that the OPEC still can impact the market with their 
quota system. The difference is breaking dates by different principal component maybe 
due to lagged adjustments, i.e., inventory drawdowns or leakage of information may result 
in the break happening not on the announcement date.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the B-Spline method to 
construct smooth functional curves from observable discrete sample points and the 
functional principal component decomposition. Section 3 considers hypothesis testing 
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methods to estimate and test for a structural break. We discuss the crude oil market in 
details in section 4, and the possible impact OPEC production quota announcements have 
onto the price of crude oil. Data description and empirical results and interpretation are 
found in section 5. Finally, we conclude in section 6. 
2. Representing Forward Curves as Functions and FPCA  
In this section, we shall describe how we can represent discrete points as a function by 
fitting the using B-Spline methodology. The constructed forward curves are decomposed 
into a fixed small sum of latent functions and random scalars using the functional principal 
component method. This type of decomposition allows us to reduce the variability of an 
infinite dimensional curve into one latent curve and a one-dimensional random scalar. 
Forward Curve Construction Using B-Spline 
 
Figure 1 shows the observable contract prices of the crude oil forward curve on 28th Feb 1985 
(blue left vertical axis) and 28th Feb 2014 (green right vertical axis). The horizontal axis is the 
futures contract’s remaining time to maturity. 
In the real world, we only observe a discrete number of points on the forward price curve 
because only a limited number of contracts are available for trading. This situation is worst 
if one was to observe the forward curve during the 1980s, whereby the observed points are 
only limited to contracts less than two years. Figure 1 below shows a plot of two forward 
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curves, one in 1985 and the other in 2014. In other words, we need to find a curve that best 
represents these discrete points and at the same time allows us to learn about other prices 
on the forward curve that are not observable. For these purposes, we have chosen to 
represent the forward curve using linear combinations of B-Splines. 
(Boor, 1972) provides us an efficient way to evaluate the B-Spline. We start with a knot 
sequence 𝜏 ≔ (𝜏𝑖) and partition curve at every 30 days time-to-maturity (i.e. 30 days=
𝜏1 < 𝜏2 < ⋯ < 𝜏12 = 360 days). The B-Spline of order 1 for this knot sequence are 
functions defined as: 
𝐵𝑖,1(𝜏) = {
1,    𝑖𝑓 𝜏𝑖 ≤ 𝜏 < 𝜏𝑖+1
0,              𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
From these first-order B-Splines, we can obtain 𝑘 order B-Splines by the following 
recursive equation: 
𝐵𝑖,𝑘(𝜏) = 𝜔𝑖,𝑘𝐵𝑖,𝑘−1(𝜏) + (1 − 𝜔𝑖+1,𝑘)𝐵𝑖+1,𝑘−1(𝜏) 
𝜔𝑖,𝑘(𝜏) = {
𝜏 − 𝜏𝑖
𝜏𝑖+𝑘−1 − 𝜏𝑖
,    𝑖𝑓 𝜏𝑖 ≠ 𝜏𝑖+𝑘−1
0,                              𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
Therefore, a B-Spline curve of order 𝑘 with knot sequence 𝜏 can then be written as: 
𝑃(𝜏) = ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝐵𝑖,𝑘(𝜏)
𝑖
 
where the parameters 𝑎𝑖’s are to be estimated. In this paper, we chose 𝑘 = 4 (Cubic Spline) 
and 𝜏𝑖 for 𝑖 = 1,2, … , τmax representing time-to-maturity up to the maximum possible 
observable contract for all forward curves within a specific sample window. Least squares 
are used to estimate the parameters 𝑎𝑖’s. For more information on estimating the B-spline, 
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one can refer to (Reinsch, 1967). In addition to estimating the curve parameters, 
interpolation to trim off curves that are longer than τmax years to maturity and extrapolation 
are added on curves that starts with maturity more than 30days are used. Interpolation and 
extrapolation are required to treat the B-Splines because they are only well defined within 
the specified interval [min (𝜏𝑖), max (𝜏𝑖)]. To implement the extrapolation, we convert the 
estimated curve from B-Spline form its equivalent piece-wise polynomial form. Since in 
general piece-wise cubic spline is very volatile during extrapolation outside its interval, we 
reduced the order of the curve outside the interval to one to estimate these points. This 
procedure can be observed from figure 2 which shows an example of a curve that did not 
fulfil the requirement of having maturities from 30 days to 360 days. From figure 2, the 
first derivative of the extrapolated part of the curve is constant. 
 
Figure 2 shows the curve and its derivative before and after extrapolation. 
After extrapolation, we can now convert the curve back to B form. Analysing curves 
instead of just a vector of multiple discrete points allow modeling the smooth shape of the 
curve. As previously mentioned, the shape of the curve contains important information on 
future supply and demand. The term backwardation and contango is usually used to 
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describe the shape of the forward curve’s slope in the commodity markets. These are one 
of the many technical terms market participants use to describe the shape of the curve and 
its information content to the market. However, most of the analysis about the curve is just 
one-dimensional. For example, in the theory of normal backwardation by (Keynes, 1923), 
he states that forward prices are always below expected spot price due to hedging demands 
by producers. Therefore, a downward sloping curve (a curve in backwardation) would shift 
upwards with time and converge towards the current level. However, parallel shifts are not 
the only way a curve could move. It could also rotate about an axis, changing from a 
downward sloping curve to an upward sloping curve. This phenomenon is present in the 
commodity markets where participants observe time periods where the curve is in contango 
(upward sloping) instead of a backwardated curve. Theories such as the storage cost model 
and the reverse hedging demand arguments are often cited to describe such phenomenon. 
The functional principal component analysis allows us to decompose the curve into smaller 
interpretable components which in turn describe how the curve changes its shape through 
time. 
Functional Principal Components 
Functional principal components analysis is a functional extension of the popular principal 
components analysis. Its usage is particularly popular in fields of meteorology and biology 
where observable data tend to be in functional forms such as the temperature of a city in 
different months or the movement of our ankles and knees while walking. (Ramsay & 
Silverman, 2005) provide a comprehensive introduction to Functional Data Analysis, and 
the following discussion can be found more in-depth in (Ramsay & Silverman, 2005).  
The log Futures Price curve is assumed to follow the following general model: 
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𝑙𝑛𝑃(𝑡, 𝜏) = 𝜇(𝜏) + ∑   𝜆𝑘
1
2𝑓𝑘,𝑡𝜙𝑘(𝜏)
∞
𝑘=1
 
where 𝜇(𝜏) is the unconditional mean curve, 𝜆𝑘 is the 𝑘
𝑡ℎ eigenvalue corresponding to the 
𝑘𝑡ℎ eigenfunction Φ𝑘(𝜏), and 𝑓𝑘,𝑡 is the time-varying 𝑘
𝑡ℎ principal component. We shall 
further assume that the mean of each principal component is 0, 𝐸[𝑓𝑘,𝑡+1] = 0 and the 
principal components are orthogonal to each other: 
𝐸[𝑓𝑘,𝑡+1𝑓𝑘′,𝑡+1] = {
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑘 ≠ 𝑘′
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑘 = 𝑘′
. 
Using the same notation as section 2, we define a set of 𝐽 Basis functions 
𝐵1(𝜏), 𝐵2(𝜏), … , 𝐵𝐽(𝜏) such that each log futures price curve has a representative basis 
expansion, i.e. 𝑋𝑡(𝜏) ≡ 𝑙𝑛?̂?(𝑡, 𝜏) = ∑ ?̂?𝑡,𝑗𝐵𝑗(𝜏)
𝐽
𝑗=1 . The parameters 𝑐𝑗 are estimated using 
Least-squares spline approximation. Defining a Matrix 𝑋 and stacking the time-series of 
curves as shown, we can write the samples in matrix form: 
𝑋 = (
𝑋1(𝜏)
𝑋2(𝜏)
⋮
𝑋𝑇(𝜏)
) = (
𝑐1,1
∗ ⋯ 𝑐1,𝐽
∗
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑐𝑇,1
∗ ⋯ 𝑐𝑇,𝐽
∗
) (
𝐵1(𝜏)
𝐵2(𝜏)
⋮
𝐵𝐽(𝜏)
) = 𝐶𝐵(𝜏) 
We then estimate the daily log futures price mean as 𝜇(𝜏) = 1′𝑋(1′1)−1, where 1 denote 
a vector of ones. Without loss of generality, we now assume that 𝑋 has mean zero or that 
our sample has been de-trended, 𝑋 = 𝑋 − 𝜇(𝜏).  In matrix terms, the variance-covariance 
operator is: 
𝑣(𝑟, 𝑠) = (1′1)−1𝐵(𝑟)′𝐶′𝐶𝐵(𝑠) 
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Suppose also we assume that an eigenfunction 𝜉(𝑠) has a basis expansion similar to the 
price curve i.e. 
𝜉(𝑠) = ∑ 𝑏𝑗𝐵𝑗(𝑠)
𝐽
𝑗=1
= 𝑏′𝐵(𝑠) 
then our functional eigenanalysis problem is reduced to simply finding an optimal function 
𝜉(𝑠) such that the mean-square defined as 
1
𝑡
∑ 𝑓𝑡
2
𝑡  is maximized. Where 𝑓𝑡 =
∫ 𝜉(𝑠)𝑋𝑡(𝑠)𝑑𝑠. Intuitively this means that we want to find an eigenfunction such that the 
projected univariate principal component contained the maximum possible variation 
measured by variance. To solve this, we have to impose an additional constraint that the 
norm of the eigenfunction is equal to 1, i.e.  ‖𝜉(𝑠)‖ = ∫ 𝜉(𝑠)2𝑑𝑠 = 1.  
In theory, 𝑓𝑡 can be thought of the price of a portfolio of infinite futures contract with 
uniquely different maturities with infinite invariant weights 𝜉(𝑠). This portfolio would in 
turn captures most of the variation of all the futures contracts combine. In theory, 𝑓𝑡 is a 
tradable asset, therefore some may refer this as factor prices. By examining the dynamics 
of the principal components 𝑓𝑡, we will be able to understand the cause of variation of the 
forward price curve. 
Simplifying the functional eigenanalysis problem, 
∫ 𝑣(𝜏, 𝑠)𝜉(𝑠)𝑑𝑠 = ∫ (1′1)−1𝐵(𝑟)′𝐶′𝐶𝐵(𝑠)𝐵(𝑠)′𝑏𝑑𝑠 
= 𝐵(𝜏)′(1′1)−1𝐶′𝐶𝑊𝑏 
where 𝑊 = ∫ 𝐵(𝑠)𝐵(𝑠)′𝑑𝑠 
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Note that 𝑊 can be easily computed given our choice of the basis function. Then, since 
∫ 𝑣(𝜏, 𝑠)𝜉(𝑠)𝑑𝑠 = 𝜆𝜉(𝜏) and defining 𝑢 = 𝑤
1
2𝑏: 
𝐵(𝜏)′(1′1)−1𝐶′𝐶𝑊𝑏 = 𝜆𝐵(𝜏)′𝑏 
(1′1)−1∫ 𝐵(𝜏){𝐵(𝜏)′𝐶′𝐶𝑊𝑏}𝑑𝜏 = 𝜆∫ 𝐵(𝜏)𝐵(𝜏)′𝑏𝑑𝜏 
(1′1)−1𝑊𝐶′𝐶𝑊𝑏 = 𝜆𝑊𝑏 
(1′1)−1𝑊
1
2𝑊
1
2𝐶′𝐶𝑊
1
2𝑢 = 𝜆𝑊
1
2𝑢 
(1′1)−1𝑊
1
2𝐶′𝐶𝑊
1
2𝑢 = 𝜆𝑢 
Using single value decomposition of (1′1)−1𝑊
1
2𝐶′𝐶𝑊
1
2, we will be able to solve for 
𝜆𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑢𝑖, where i denote it as the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ eigenvalue and 𝑖𝑡ℎ eigenvector. The basis expansion 
coefficients for the 𝑖𝑡ℎ eigenfunction, 𝑏𝑖 = 𝑊
−
1
2𝑢𝑖. Thereafter the time-series of each 
principal component score can be computed, 𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = ∫ 𝑏𝑖
′𝐵(𝜏)𝑋𝑡(𝜏)𝑑𝜏. In this paper, we 
focus on the first three main variations which account for more than 99% of the total return 
variation.  
Since the eigenvectors in the singular value decomposition of the term (1′1)−1𝑊
1
2𝐶′𝐶𝑊
1
2 
is unique up to the signs, the non-unique solution would also be transferred to the estimated 
eigenfunctions and thereafter principal components. We define a unique eigenfunction by 
setting 𝜉1(𝜏) = 𝜉1(𝜏) if 𝜉1(1) > 0 and 𝜉1(𝜏) = −𝜉1(𝜏) if 𝜉1(1) < 0. By this definition, 
the estimated principal components would also be uniquely estimated. Such definition 
allows us to interpret the principal components.  
10 
 
3. Testing and Dating the unknown Break 
Off-line tests of change point, or commonly known as structural break tests, have attracted 
lots of academic research in the last 20 years (for an extensive review see (Perron, 2006)). 
This area of research started its origin in the biomedical research in the 1960s. The theory 
of structural break is usually split into two different problems: First, hypothesis testing of 
whether there is at least one change point; Second, to be able to estimate and date the timing 
of the change. 
When the break date is known prior, a test of whether there exist a break becomes a problem 
of testing whether the parameters of the model before and after the break differs 
significantly. The (Chow, 1960) test statistics are widely used to address this problem. The 
F distribution or the chi-square asymptotic distribution can then be used to test the 
hypothesis of no change in parameters versus at least one change to determine whether the 
known break date is a break. However, in the case of an unknown break date, the chow test 
would become invalid. In particular, if one still compute the standard chow statistic over 
all possible break dates and pick the largest chow statistics as the representative one, the 
critical value derived from the chi-square distribution will usually over-reject the null in 
favor of the alternative. This idea of taking the largest possible Chow statistics is pioneered 
by (Quandt, 1960) but instead uses a different set of correct critical values than those found 
in the chi-square distribution. Note that the supremum chow statistics converge to a non-
standard distribution.  
The literature extends the idea of taking the maximum statistic value of all the possible 
break dates and proposes different estimation methods. When the problem is simplified to 
simple i.i.d. normal random variables, the exact distribution of the likelihood ratio test 
11 
 
statistic is developed heuristically by (Hawkins, Testing a sequence of observations for a 
shift in location, 1977). (Hawkins, Gallant, & Fuller, A simple least squares method for 
estimating a change in mean, 1986) proposes the least squares method while (Andrews, 
Tests for Parameter Instability and Structural Change with Unknown Change Point, 1993) 
generalized it to GMM estimators. Asymptotically, all the test statistics converge to the 
supremum standardized tied-down Bessel process.  (Andrews & Ploberger, Optimal tests 
when a nuisance parameter is present only under the alternative, 1994) extends this idea 
and derives asymptotically optimal test to tests for one-time structural change with 
unknown change-point. Although the limit distribution is non-standard, (Hansen, 1997) 
developed an easy and accurate program to estimate the asymptotic p values of the sup 𝐹, 
exp 𝐹 and 𝑎𝑣𝑒 𝐹 tests. However, to implement these tests, one can only search for a break 
in a sub-interval within the sample. (Andrews, Tests for Parameter Instability and 
Structural Change with Unknown Change Point, 1993) proposes to look for breaks with in 
the interval [0.15, 0.85], which corresponds to a trimming value of 15%. These authors 
argue that since the power to detect for a break at the extreme ends is low, one can instead 
start to look for a break date closer to the middle of the sample. If on the other hand, the 
true break is in the middle of the sample, the power of the trimmed test will be greater than 
the test without trimming. 
Another strand of literature that disagree with the trimming methodology like (Yao & 
Davis, The asymptotic behavior of the likelihoodd ratio statistic for testing a shift in mean 
in a sequence of independent normal variates, 1986) and (Horvath, 1993) derive a 
Likelihood ratio statistic that converge under the null to a Gumbel type of extreme value 
distribution. This is only possible if the likelihood ratio statistic is properly normalized. 
12 
 
Subsequently (Davis, Huang, & Yao, 1995) extends this analysis to autoregressive models. 
The advantage of using these test is that the user does not need to identify a trimming value. 
However, the cost would be a slight lost in power if the true break date is in the middle of 
the sample.  
On the dating of breaks, Bai (1993) developed an asymptotic distribution of the break date 
estimation using least squares while (Yao, Approximating the distribution of the maximum 
likelihood estimate of the change-point in a sequence of independent random variables, 
1987) developed the distribution of the break date estimated using maximum likelihood. 
In both cases, the model parameters converge in distribution to the normal distribution.   
In this paper, we shall adopt the (Davis, Huang, & Yao, 1995) methodology. We now 
model the evolution of the principal components as a simple AR(1) process. The long-run 
means of the functional curves and the eigenfunction is assumed to be constant within each 
window period. Under this setup, we can test whether there is a break in the curve by testing 
whether there is a change in the parameters of the principal component process. A break in 
the first principal component represents a level break. A break in the second component 
will be a slope break while the third will be the curvature break. 
Let {𝑋𝑖}𝑖=1
𝑛  be n consecutive observations from the AR(p) model: 
𝑋𝑡 = 𝜙0 + 𝜙1𝑋𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝜙𝑝𝑋𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜖𝑡     − ∞ < 𝑡 ≤ 𝜏, 
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑋𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛼𝑝𝑋𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜖𝑡      𝑡 ≥ 𝜏 + 1 
We compute the Gaussian Likelihood ratio, conditional on the first 𝑝 observations, 
Λ𝑛(𝑘) ≡ −2 ln (
𝐿(𝑛)
𝐿(𝑘)
) 
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= min
𝜙
∑ (𝑋𝑡 − 𝜙0 − 𝜙1𝑋𝑡−1 − ⋯ − 𝜙𝑡−𝑝)
2
𝑛
𝑡=𝑝+1
 
− min
𝜙
∑ (𝑋𝑡 − 𝜙0 − 𝜙1𝑋𝑡−1 − ⋯ − 𝜙𝑡−𝑝)
2
𝑘
𝑡=𝑝+1
 
− min
𝜙
∑ (𝑋𝑡 − 𝜙0 − 𝜙1𝑋𝑡−1 − ⋯ − 𝜙𝑡−𝑝)
2
𝑛
𝑡=𝑘+1
 
 
 
Theorem 1  
Under 𝐻0, 
𝑃 [
𝜎−2Λ𝑛 − 𝑏𝑛(𝑝 + 1)
𝑎𝑛(𝑝 + 1)
≤ 𝑥] → exp (−2𝑒−
𝑥
2) 
Where Λ𝑛 = max
𝑝<𝑘≤𝑛
Λ𝑛(𝑘) is the likelihood ratio statistic, 𝑏𝑛(𝑑) =
(2 ln ln 𝑛+(
𝑑
2
) ln ln 𝑛−ln Γ(
𝑑
2
))
2
2 ln ln 𝑛
 and 𝑎𝑛(𝑑) = √
𝑏𝑛
2 ln ln 𝑛
 are the normalizing constants and Γ(𝑥) 
is the gamma function. 
The probability density function can be written as, 
𝜎−2Λ𝑛 − 𝑏𝑛(𝑝 + 1)
𝑎𝑛(𝑝 + 1)
→𝑑
1
2
exp(−𝑧 − 𝑒−𝑧)  
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where 𝑧 =
𝑥−𝜇
𝛽
. This is a Gumbel distribution with the location parameter 𝜇 = 2 ln 2 and 
the scale parameter 𝛽 = 2. Simulations on the size and power of the test are documented 
in the appendix. 
4. OPEC and the crude oil market 
OPEC and its effects on crude oil price is a topic that resurfaces from time to time. The 
impact by OPEC as a cartel organization on oil prices be it through its price targets, or 
production quotas are still inconclusive. However, now and then, governments and media 
would blame oil price spikes or crashes onto OPEC. Descriptive analysis of crude oil 
chronological global events and OPEC subsequent decisions from 1947 to 2001 can be 
found in (Gately, 1984), (Adelman, 2002) and (Kohl, 2002). These papers suggest that 
OPEC have poor access to timely information, therefore causing awkward, sticky and slow 
decision, which in turn leads to overshooting and undershooting their price targets.  
Recently, crude oil prices rallied weeks before the Doha meeting, on 17th April 2016, 
between major OPEC and non-OPEC countries only to plunged 6.7% to $37.7 a barrel for 
U.S. crude and 6.9% to $40.14 a barrel for Brent the next day. This was one reaction by 
the market after the failure to freeze oil production was announced. Contrary to popular 
belief, evidence that OPEC meetings or announcements are influencing oil prices is still 
inconclusive.  
OPEC conferences are held bi-annually (June and December), and a few weeks before each 
conference, ministerial meetings are also held. Ministerial meetings usually consist of 
OPEC’s monitoring committee and some non-OPEC observers. Conference proposals and 
details are usually settled during these ministerial meetings before the OPEC bi-annual 
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conferences. In addition to the bi-annual conferences, extraordinary conferences may be 
called whenever OPEC deems fit.  
Research into OPEC conferences and its impact on oil prices has a long history. By 
examining the correlation between OPEC policy changes and changes in spot oil for all 
meetings between 1974 to 1983, (Loderer, 1984) show that OPEC has no impact on prices 
during the oil price increase of 1974-1980. However, during the oil price decrease of 1980 
to 1983, some ability to impact prices was shown. This result is consistent with similar 
work by (Draper, 1984) who examine abnormal returns of heating oil futures from 1978 to 
1980 and conclude that investors seem to have anticipated the meeting results before the 
actual meeting took place. These earlier papers also support the idea that OPEC can affect 
prices after the introduction of the quota system in April 1982 (see (Gülen, 1996)). 
As pointed out, the results in the earlier papers were not robust through time. Using an 
ARCH benchmark model to compute cumulative abnormal returns, (Demirer & Kutan, 
2010) show that a production cut leads to significant positive abnormal returns with post-
OPEC announcement drifts. (Hyndman 2008) Estimated the impact to be 10% for spot oil 
price and 6% for an index of oil firms. He suggests that during “good times,” OPEC will 
always increase production and therefore anticipated, while during “bad times,” OPEC 
wants to cut production but faces challenges to bargain with fellow members and therefore 
the results are unanticipated. Similarly, (Wirl & Kujundzic, 2004) show that an agreement 
on a price reduction takes on average 4.14 conference days while a price increase and a no-
change results take 3.56 and 2.11 days respectively.  (Loutia, Mellios, & Andriosopoulos, 
2016) suggest that since only OPEC have the spare capacity to intervene with market 
prices, an increase in production to capture more market share is a signal for the market 
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that OPEC is gaining more market power resulting in higher future oil prices. On the other 
hand, if the increase in production is the result of diminishing spare capacity, then it limits 
its ability to manipulate oil prices. On the contrary, using modified dummy variables with 
GARCH modeling to estimate the impact of OPEC announcement, (Schmidbauer & 
Rösch, 2012) finds that oil price return decrease after a production cut announcement. They 
cited reasons such as higher probability to “cheat” after the agreement and deviation from 
market expectations. 
The main short-coming of these papers is the difficulty to determine market expectation 
and therefore surprises from OPEC conferences outcomes. Unlike the FED announcements 
of whether to increase or decrease interest rates, the market probability can be measured 
using the FED funds futures. Using a different measure, (Deaves & Krinsky, The Behavior 
of Oil Futures Returns Around OPEC Conferences, 1992b) split conferences into “Good 
News” and Bad News after the event date whereby positive cumulative abnormal returns 
one day after the event is “Good News”. They show that on average trader underreact to 
positive news only and abnormal returns of 5% can be earned up to 10 days. (Horan, 
Peterson, & Mahar, 2004) argue that the results obtained by (Deaves & Krinsky, The 
Behavior of Oil Futures Returns Around OPEC Conferences, 1992b) can be explained by 
the volatility risk premium earned after the uncertainty is being resolved. After a bullish 
news, a long investor will earn both volatility risk premium and the surprised abnormal 
returns which explain the positive drift after the event day. However, after a bearish news, 
a long investor will still earn volatility risk premium but suffer a loss from the surprised 
negative news. In a different setting, using ARCH-M model to model futures returns 
(Deaves & Krinsky, Risk Premiums and Efficiency in the Market for Crude Oil Futures, 
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1992a) show that crude oil futures have a positive and significant risk-premium for long 
investors and this risk-premium is a compensation for ex-ante volatility. 
On the second order effects on oil prices, (Horan, Peterson, & Mahar, 2004) show that 
implied volatility increases before the meeting and decreases (3%) after the meeting 
showing some form of uncertainty is resolved. This result is strong for the Ministerial 
Monitoring Committee (MMC) meetings (additional 7%). This suggests that MMC 
meetings are more informative than the actual conferences as the MMC meeting is the 
primary policy-making body in that it makes recommendations on future production levels 
to the larger conference. While (Wang, Wu, & Yang, 2008) show that weekly volatility is 
higher before OPEC recommends a price increase but not for cuts and maintain 
recommendations. On the shape of the futures curve during different price regimes, 
(Deaves & Krinsky, Risk Premiums and Efficiency in the Market for Crude Oil Futures, 
1992a) explained that futures curve is “backwardation” during the period of increasing 
price. Since during period of increasing prices due to OPEC production cuts, the market 
priced in the probability of a production quota discipline breakdown. Therefore, prices in 
the future are lower than the current spot price. The opposite will also be true during periods 
of low prices were market priced in the probability of a future production cut. 
5. Empirical Analysis  
In this section, our method is applied to crude oil futures curve around OPEC 
announcement date. Condition on an OPEC announcement date, we select a sample 
window period or 30 days before and after the event date. This would translate to a sample 
size of 61. To estimate the long-run mean curve and the latent eigenfunctions, we use the 
latest 125 sample points before our sample window. After that, we estimate the principal 
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components using the historical mean function and eigenfunctions. In our empirical design, 
only the principal components are allowed to break and change at an unknown date.   
DATA 
The crude oil forward curve used in the paper is the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude 
oil futures traded on New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). These daily futures prices 
with various maturities are obtained from the data provider Datastream and span from 30th 
March 1983 to 24th  August 2017. In total, our sample consists of 8972 trading days 
spanning over a period of 35 years. WTI crude oil prices serve as an important benchmark 
and reference price for crude oil market players globally. The WTI crude oil futures 
underlying is the physical WTI crude oil trading in Cushing, Oklahoma. However, the 
underlying spot prices are usually not publicly available as they traded over-the-counter 
privately. Therefore, the reference to spot prices is the price of the nearest-maturity month 
futures price. Monthly contracts stretching up to 5 years forward are available for trading 
at every trading day. These contracts expire on the third business day before the twenty-
fifth calendar day of the month preceding the delivery month. This information is then used 
to compute each contract’s time-to-maturity. Combining with prices, for each trading day, 
we will be able to observe some points on the forward curve which describes the price to 
maturity relation on any trading day.      
Interpretation of the Principal Components  
In this section, we shall assume that the futures price curve, ln 𝐹𝑡(𝜏), can be decomposed 
into the following K-factor model such that the factors follows an AR(1) process: 
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ln 𝐹𝑡(𝜏) = 𝜇(𝜏) + ∑ √𝜆𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝜙𝑘(𝜏)𝑓𝑘,𝑡 
𝑓𝑘,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑓𝑘,𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡 
We shall describe and interpret the effect of each factor had on to the futures curve. We 
shall describe the shape of each related eigenfunctions,𝜙𝑘(𝜏), and how 1 standard 
deviation of factor shock changes the shape of the curve. Although our empirical study is 
on the WTI crude oil futures curve, its results can be generalized to other curves if the 
shape of the eigenfunctions are similar. (Forzani & Tolmasky, 2003) shows that the crude 
oil futures curve and the interest rate curve have the same first three principal component 
factors. The accuracy of the FPCA estimation is analysed in the appendix in the form of an 
error function. 
Figure (3) shows the first three eigenfunctions of the crude oil futures curve while figure 
(4) shows how the mean curve, 𝜇(𝜏), response when a standard deviation of positive factor 
shock, 𝑓𝑘,𝑡, and a standard deviation of negative shock is introduced into the system. The 
label “level”, “slope”, and “curvature” originated from the literature on interest rate curve. 
However, from figure (4), we can observe similar changes to the unconditional mean. 
10 20 30 40
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
Time-to-Maturity () (Months)
 
 
Level
Slope
Curvature
Figure 3a shows the first three eigenfunctions estimated from the time-series of the WTI 
crude oil futures curve from 3rd January 1997 to 21st April 2017. 
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Figure 3b shows the impact of each principal component shocks onto the curve. The x-axis is the 
time-to-maturity of the futures contract while the y-axis is the price of the futures curve in natural 
logarithm. The black line refers to the original unconditional mean futures curve while the blue like 
is its deviation after one standard deviation of positive factor shock is realized. The red line is its 
deviation after one standard deviation of negative factor shock is realized. The impact onto each 
curve is scaled by a factor of 5%, 10%, and 20% respectively. The standard deviation of each 
factor is, √𝜆, is 23.58, 1.84, and 0.31. 
Figure (4) shows the perturbation analysis of the unconditional mean for each factor shock. 
We use appropriate scaling to make each graph more visible. The black line refers to the 
original unconditional mean futures curve while the blue line is its deviation after one 
standard deviation of positive factor shock is realized. The red line is its deviation after one 
standard deviation of negative factor shock is realized. Consistent with the literature, the 
first eigenfunction shifts the curve in a parallel manner. A positive shock will shift the 
curve upwards while negative shocks will shift the curve downwards. The second 
eigenfunction rotates the curve about a point. A positive shock will rotate the curve 
clockwise while a negative shock will rotate the curve anti-clockwise. Lastly, the third 
eigenfunction twists the curve in a manner such that a positive shock will rotate the near-
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term and long-term contracts upwards while rotating the mid-term contracts downwards. 
This form of movement will cause the curve to have a “hump” or a “ditch”. Information 
derived from the shape of the curve is not new in the literature.  
In the commodity literature, a cost-of-carry model is usually used to explain the shape of 
the commodity forward curve. When the gradient of the curve is sloping upwards (in 
contango), it implies that the cost of holding the physical underlying outweighs its benefits 
therefore in equilibrium long-term contracts have a higher price than short-term ones. 
When the shape of the curve is sloping downwards (in backwardation), it implies that the 
benefits of holding the physical underlying outweigh its cost of holding. Therefore in 
equilibrium, the short-term contracts would have prices higher than the long-terms ones. 
These benefits are the inherent advantages accrued to the investor by holding the physical 
goods rather than holding cash and buying the physical goods at a later date. Therefore we 
should expect changes to the costs and benefits of holding the physical underlying would 
be directly related to the 2nd factor and 3rd factor. Examples of the cost of holding the 
physical commodity are the interest rate, transportation, and storage. These costs are 
usually privately observable through over-the-counter transactions or bidding in private 
auction markets but may not be publicly available. This makes analyzing these costs 
difficult and challenging in practice. On the other hand, the benefits of holding the physical 
commodity are almost always unobservable. The literature coin the term convenience yield 
to label these inherent benefits one would obtain by holding the physical goods instead of 
cash. Possible examples of convenience yield are bulk purchase savings and precautionary 
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yield. Precautionary yield is the advantage of owning the physical goods during periods of 
sudden temporary shortage of supplies1.  
Interpretation of each factor is usually difficult, and many papers try to explain each factors 
using economic variables. Instead, in this paper, we try to use simple measures of futures 
returns and slope to show the equivalence of the estimated factors. We show that the first 
factor is the cumulative sum of the average maturity futures return up to time 𝑡 and the 
second factor is the average slope of the forward curve at time 𝑡. Therefore, any attempts 
to try to explain these factors will be equilvalent to trying to explain futures returns and 
explaining the slope. Note that the orthogonal concept also hold true. Factors that affect 
the slope of the curve at time 𝑡 should be independent with past futures return before time 
𝑡. We compute the measure of average forward curve portfolio returns using: 
1
(𝑇2 − 𝑇1)
∫ ln
𝐹𝑡(𝜏)
𝐹𝑡−1(𝜏)
𝑇2
𝑇1
𝑑𝜏 (1) 
Where 𝑇1 and 𝑇2 are the maturity range of the futures contract. Similarly, the cummulative 
sum of the portfolio returns  from 𝑡 = 0 to 𝑡 = 𝑇 can be computed from  
1
(𝑇2−𝑇1)
∫ ln
𝐹𝑇(𝜏)
𝐹0(𝜏)
𝑇2
𝑇1
𝑑𝜏. In figure (3), we plot the cummulative sum of the portfolio returns 
with the 1st principal component. The correlation between both variables are almost 1. This 
should not be surprising when we when observe the structure of the 1st eigenfunction. It is 
a continuous weighted average of the forward curve. This is equivalent to buying a long 
portfolio of infinite futures contracts ranging from maturity 𝑇1 to maturity 𝑇2 using the 
weighting scheme dictated by the 1st eigenfunction. From figure (1), this weighting scheme 
                                                          
1 (Alquist & Kilian, 2010) use the spread between spot contracts and longer term contracts as a measure 
of precautionary demand.  
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is amost a equally weighted scheme. Therefore the first factor is the cummulative sum of 
the equally weighted long futures portfolio returns.    
 
Figure 4 shows the plot of the cumulative sum of the average portfolio returns (right y-
axis) and the 1st principal component (left y-axis). The correlation between both variables 
is 0.99. The average portfolio return is computed from equation (1), while the 1st principal 
component is estimated using the functional principal component method. 
We compute the measure the average slope of the forward curve using: 
1
(𝑇2 − 𝑇1)
∫
𝜕 ln 𝐹𝑡(𝜏)
𝜕𝜏
𝑇2
𝑇1
𝑑𝜏 (2) 
A number more than 0 implies that the forward curve is in contango while a number less 
than 0 implies that the forward curve is in backwardation. Similarly, we can measure the 
average concavity of the curve using the following equation: 
1
(𝑇2 − 𝑇1)
∫
𝜕2 ln 𝐹𝑡(𝜏)
𝜕𝜏2
𝑇2
𝑇1
𝑑𝜏 (3) 
Figure (3) plot the time-series of this measure against the time-series of the 2nd factor. Since 
a positive 2nd factor will rotate the curve clockwise making the slope of the curve more 
negative, therefore we shall multiply the 2nd factor by −1 for comparison. From figure (3), 
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we can observe that the 2nd principal component gives a very good measure of the average 
slope of the forward curve. The correlation between the 2nd principal component and the 
average slope measure is 0.97. On the other hand, the correlation of the 3rd principal 
component and the average concavity measure is 0.42. 
 
Figure 5 shows the plot of the average slope of the curve (right y-axis) and the 2nd principal 
component (left y-axis). The correlation between both variables is 0.97. The average slope 
of the curve is computed from equation (2), while the 2nd principal component is estimated 
using the functional principal component method. 
 
Figure 6 shows the plot of the average concavity of the curve (right y-axis) and the 3rd 
principal component (left y-axis). The correlation between both variables is 0.42. The 
average concavity is computed using equation (3) while the 3rd principal component is 
estimated using the functional principal component method. 
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Figure 7 shows the estimated first volatility function √𝜆1𝜙1(𝜏). The x-axis is the 
corresponding time-to-maturity of the futures curve and the y-axis is its volatility value. 
The volatility function accounts for 99.37% of the curve total volatility. 
Alternatively, one can also view the function, √𝜆𝑘𝜙𝑘(𝜏), as a volatility function. Since 
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑓𝑘,𝑡) = 1, the standard deviation of the log futures curve is approximately 
proportional to the eigenfunction, i.e. 𝑠𝑡𝑑(ln 𝐹𝑡(𝜏)) ≈ √𝜆1𝜙1(𝜏). If we plot the first 
eigenfunction, we can observe that it is a downward sloping positive function. This 
empirical observation supports the “Samuelson Hypothesis” which claims that the 
volatility of futures prices increases as the contract delivery date approaches to zero. 
(Bessembinder, Coughenour, Seguin, & Smoller, 1996) argues that the Samuelson 
hypothesis holds only when investors expect that changes in the price of the underlying 
commodity will be reversed in the future. For all competitive market, commodity shortages 
or commodity glut will recovery in the long run since firms can enter or exit to balance the 
market. 
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The null hypothesis of no structural breaks is rejected if the test statistics is greater than 
1% critical value. The structural break test is applied to each principal components for 
every OPEC announcements. There are in total 93 known non-overlapping OPEC 
announcements within our sample period from 30th March 1983 to 24th August 2017. Out 
of the 93 known events, 38 are found to exhibit at least a break in the time-series one of 
the principal components. The tables below plot each of the 38 events. Both the pre-sample 
period of 125 trading days and the sample window of 61 trading days are shown in the 
graphical plot where the solid black vertical line represents the actual announcement date 
while the dotted black vertical line denotes the start of the test window. The estimated 
model parameters are tabulated in the first column if our hypothesis of no structural break 
is rejected at the 1% significance level. The third column plots the actual raw curves before 
and after the estimated unknown break date. Note that for most of the cases, the estimated 
unknown break date does not correspond to the actual announcement date. This may be 
due to various reasons such as lagged adjustments or linkage of information.  
Suppose OPEC announced a surprise production cut, the time-series of the forward curve 
could break in the following way: First, a level break, in which the whole forward curve 
shifts upwards in view of a permanent shortage of crude oil supply both in the near future 
and long term. Second, a slope break, in which the whole forward curve becomes flatter or 
even negatively sloped as inventory began to drawdown due to the reduction in production. 
However, note that there is no reason to believe that both components have to break on the 
same day since the fundamentals that drives the levels and the slope are inherently 
different.   
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6. Conclusion 
This paper considers the estimation and testing of structural changes in functional curves 
that occurs at an unknown date. The functional principal component analysis is applied to 
the random functional curves, decomposing them into interpretable simple latent functions 
and random scalars. The random scalars are modelled using a simple AR(1) model and the 
test for a change in parameters at an unknown date is applied. This method is applied to 
the crude oil futures market to estimate and date possible structural breaks during OPEC 
announcement periods from 1984 to 2017.  Our analysis shows that out of the 93 known 
OPEC announcements, only 38 exhibit at least a break in one of the principal components.     
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Appendix  
1.1: Error Analysis 
ln 𝐹𝑡(𝜏
∗) = ∑ ?̂?𝑘
0.5
𝑘=1
?̂?𝑘(𝜏
∗) + ε̂t(𝜏
∗) 
In the above equation, the variables in “hat” are the estimated variables using functional 
principal components analysis method. In this section, we shall show and discuss the 
estimated properties of 𝜀?̂?(𝜏). Assumption 1: 𝐸[εt(𝜏
∗)] = 0. The figure below plots the 
sample mean of the estimated error function, i.e. 
1
𝑇
∑  𝜀?̂?(𝜏)𝑡  for 𝜏 ∈ [0, 𝜏𝑚𝑎𝑥]2. Note that 
we can always scale the range 𝜏. 
 
Figure 8 plots the estimated sample mean of the error function. 
Assumption 2: 𝐸‖𝜀?̂?(𝜏)‖
2 < ∞. The figure below plots the time-series of ‖𝜀?̂?(𝜏)‖
2 =
∫ 𝜀?̂?(𝜏)
𝜏𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝜏𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑑𝜏. The 𝐸‖𝜀?̂?(𝜏)‖
2 = 0.01.  
                                                          
2 Note that we can always scale the range 𝜏 to fit the unit length [0,1]. 
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Using Augmented Dicky-Fuller test, we show that the time-series of 𝜀?̂?(𝜏) is a stationary 
random function. This implies that the error function is I(0) and therefore the eigenvalues 
and eigenfunction estimates are consistent (Bai & Ng, Determining the number of factors 
in approximate factor models, 2002). Results for 𝜀?̂?(𝜏30) is shown below: 
 
Next, we estimate the equation 𝜀?̂?(𝜏30) = 𝜌𝜀?̂?−1(𝜏30) + 𝑢𝑡 to test whether there is any 
serial correlation in the errors. Below is the result:  
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Null Hypothesis: EPSILON_30DAYS has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend
Lag Length: 32 (Automatic - based on AIC, maxlag=32)
t-Statistic   Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -7.489385  0.0000
Test critical values: 1% level -3.959851
5% level -3.410692
10% level -3.127131
Dependent Variable: EPSILON_30DAYS
Method: Least Squares
Date: 06/28/17   Time: 15:26
Sample (adjusted): 2 5093
Included observations: 5092 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
EPSILON_30DAYS(-1) 0.969102 0.003457 280.3486 0.0000
R-squared 0.939166     Mean dependent var 6.83E-07
Adjusted R-squared 0.939166     S.D. dependent var 0.011264
S.E. of regression 0.002778     Akaike info criterion -8.933750
Sum squared resid 0.039298     Schwarz criterion -8.932466
Log likelihood 22746.33     Hannan-Quinn criter. -8.933300
Durbin-Watson stat 1.880307
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Our result shows that 𝜌 = 0.97 and is significantly different from zero at all significant 
levels. This implies that the dependent function may exhibit some form of autocorrelation. 
 
  
Sample: 1 5093
Included observations: 5092
Q-statistic probabilities adjusted for 1 dynamic regressor
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC  PAC  Q-Stat  Prob
1 0.060 0.060 18.236 0.000
2 -0.033 -0.037 23.909 0.000
3 -0.033 -0.028 29.328 0.000
4 -0.018 -0.016 31.016 0.000
5 -0.001 -0.002 31.027 0.000
6 -0.029 -0.031 35.381 0.000
7 -0.015 -0.013 36.521 0.000
8 0.048 0.047 48.186 0.000
9 0.013 0.005 49.073 0.000
10 0.012 0.012 49.752 0.000
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1.2: Simulation Analysis 
Under 𝐻0, we simulate {𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑇} where each 𝑋𝑖 follows the model describe above. 
We compute the statistic Λ𝑘 for 𝑘 = 𝑝 + 1, 𝑝 + 2, … , 𝑛. This is replicated 10 000 times. 
Test sizes of 𝛼 = 0.1, 0.05 𝑎𝑛𝑑 0.01 and 𝑇 = 25, 50, 100 𝑎𝑛𝑑 500 are shown. A number 
close to 𝛼 implies that the asymptotic distribution gives a good approximation.  
True Model 
𝑝 = 1 𝜙0 = 0 𝜙1 = 0.5 𝜎
2 = 1  
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Critical Values 
 𝛼 
𝑇 0.1 0.05 0.01 
25 6.28 7.37 9.47 
50 6.22 7.47 9.88 
100 6.07 7.38 10.11 
500 5.93 7.37 10.39 
∞ 5.89 7.33 10.59 
The asymptotic distribution is a good approximation for 𝛼 = 5%. It underestimates the 
critical value when 𝛼 = 10% and overestimate when 𝛼 = 1%. 
Size 
 𝛼 
𝑇 10% 5% 1% 
25 11.3% 4.4% 0.2% 
50 11.8% 5.5% 0.8% 
100 10.5% 5.1% 0.8% 
500 10.1% 4.8% 0.8% 
 
In this section, we simulate an AR(2) model under 𝐻0. We show that the asymptotic 
distribution is not as good a approximation for most sample sizes i.e. less than 5000.   
True Model 
𝑝 = 2 𝜙0 = 0 𝜙1 = 0.5 𝜙2 = 0.25 𝜎
2 = 1 
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Critical Values 
 𝛼 
𝑇 0.1 0.05 0.01 
100 7.35 8.69 11.41 
500 7.03 8.45 11.46 
1000 6.78 8.22 11.19 
5000 6.64 7.97 11.04 
∞ 5.89 7.33 10.59 
The asymptotic distribution is a good approximation for 𝛼 = 5%. It underestimates the 
critical value when 𝛼 = 10% and overestimate when 𝛼 = 1%. 
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 𝛼 
𝑇 10% 5% 1% 
100 19.3% 9.9% 1.5% 
500 16.7% 8.4% 1.6% 
1000 15.2% 7.3% 1.3% 
5000 14.1% 6.9% 1.2% 
The convergence rate is very slow for the AR(2) model, however the size of the statistic is 
only slightly greater for 𝛼 = 1%, suggesting that this test is still reasonable. The 
Asymptotic distribution underestimate the critical value. 
Power 
True Model 
For 
𝑡
𝑛
≤ 𝜏 =
0.5 
𝑝 = 1 𝜙0 = 0 𝜙1 = 0.5 𝜎
2 = 1 
For 
𝑡
𝑛
> 𝜏 =
0.5 
𝑝 = 1 𝜙0 = 𝛿 = 0.5 𝜙1 = 0.5 𝜎
2 = 1 
 𝛼 
𝑇 10% 5% 1% 
25 20.5% 8.8% 0.5% 
50 26.5% 14.8% 2.7% 
100 44.2% 30.4% 10.5% 
500 99.4% 98.6% 94.0% 
 
The change-to-noise ratio for this experiment is 
𝛿
𝜎
= 0.5. Let us try another true model 
with this same ratio. 
True Model 
For 
𝑡
𝑛
≤ 𝜏 = 0.5 𝑝 = 1 𝜙0 = 0 𝜙1 = 0.5 𝜎
2 = 4 
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For 
𝑡
𝑛
> 𝜏 = 0.5 𝑝 = 1 𝜙0 = 𝛿 = 1 𝜙1 = 0.5 𝜎
2 = 4 
 𝛼 
𝑇 10% 5% 1% 
25 35.9% 21.2% 3.9% 
50 46.4% 31.9% 9.7% 
100 66.9% 53.3% 26.3% 
500 100.0% 100.0% 99.8% 
 
  
 
From the observation, the greater the absolute change 𝛿 of the constant term, the higher the 
power of the test. Similarly, the lower the variance of the i.i.d. noise, the higher the power 
of the test. To summarize, we construct a change to noise ratio 
𝛿
𝜎
 and show that the 
relationship with the power of the test is increasing but non-linear. The power of the test is 
greatly influence by 𝛿. 
Estimated Parameters Distribution 
10 000 Repetition  
Sample Size 500 
1
2
3
4
0
2
4
0
0.5
1

2
Parameters change Power sensitivity 

P
o
w
e
r
0 1 2 3 4
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Noise ratio Scatter Plot
/ 
P
o
w
e
r
39 
 
True Model 
For 
𝑡
𝑛
≤ 𝜏 =
0.5 
𝑝 = 1 𝜙0 = 0 𝜙1 = 0.5 𝜎
2 = 1 
For 
𝑡
𝑛
> 𝜏 =
0.5 
𝑝 = 1 𝜙0 = 𝛿 = 4 𝜙1 = −0.5 𝜎
2 = 1 
For 
𝑡
𝑛
≤ 𝜏 = 0.5 
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𝑡
𝑛
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1.3: Structural breaks surrounding OPEC announcements 
There are in total 93 known non-overlapping OPEC announcements within our sample 
period from 30th March 1983 to 24th August 2017. Out of the 93 known events, 38 are 
found to exhibit at least a break in the time-series one of the principal components. The 
tables below plot each of the 38 events. Both the pre-sample period of 125 trading days 
and the sample window of 61 trading days are shown in the graphical plot where the solid 
black vertical line represents the actual announcement date while the dotted black vertical 
line denotes the start of the test window. The estimated model parameters are tabulated in 
the first column if our hypothesis of no structural break is rejected at the 5% significance 
level. The third column plots the actual raw curves before and after the estimated unknown 
break date. Note that for most of the cases, the estimated unknown break date does not 
correspond to the actual announcement date. This may be due to various reasons such as 
lagged adjustments or linkage of information. The dotted black curve are the curves before 
the break while the solid blue curve are the curves after the break. All break positions are 
number of days relative to the actual announcement date. 
 Break Found 
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 Break Found 
 
 
 PC
1 
PC
2 
PC
3 
     
 Parameters 
𝜇1 
  -0.17 
𝜙1 
  0.82 
𝜇2 
  -0.17 
𝜙2 
  -0.58 
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  0.88 
 
 Break Found  
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 Break Found  
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 Parameters 
𝜇1 
0.2 -0.14 -0.08 
𝜙1 
1.03 1.04 0.95 
𝜇2 
2.51 -3.15 -3.01 
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0.54 0.33 0.23 
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 Break Found  
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 Parameters 
𝜇1 
  -0.12 
𝜙1 
  0.6 
𝜇2 
  -1.7 
𝜙2 
  0.55 
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 Break Found  
 
 PC
1 
PC
2 
PC
3 
     
 Parameters 
𝜇1 
-0.72   
𝜙1 
0.54   
𝜇2 
-2.00   
𝜙2 
0.01   
 
 
 
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
17
17.5
18
18.5
19
19.5
20
20.5
21
21.5
11/03/1991
PC3 Break POS -14
5 10 15 20 25 30
20.4
20.6
20.8
21
21.2
21.4
21.6
21.8
22
22.2
22.4
24/09/1991
PC2 Break POS -15
5 10 15 20 25 30
20
20.5
21
21.5
22
22.5
24/09/1991
PC3 Break POS -23
5 10 15 20 25 30
18.2
18.4
18.6
18.8
19
19.2
19.4
19.6
19.8
20
20.2
12/02/1992
PC1 Break POS 1
17-Aug 14-Sep 12-Oct 09-Nov 06-Dec 03-Jan 31-Jan 28-Feb
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Wednesday, 12-Feb-1992
1 days
28-Apr 01-Jun 04-Jul 06-Aug 09-Sep 12-Oct
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
Tuesday, 24-Sep-1991
-15 days
-23 days
10-Oct 13-Nov 16-Dec 18-Jan 21-Feb 26-Mar
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Monday, 11-Mar-1991
-14 days
44 
 
 Break Found  
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 Break Found  
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Chapter 2: 
Precautionary Demand and Crude Oil Inventories around OPEC meetings   
Abstract 
In this paper, we revisit this age-old research question and examine the impact of OPEC 
announcements on the crude oil market but from another angle: How OPEC production 
quota announcements affect an investor’s optimal storage decisions? We show evidence 
that investors increase their crude oil inventories before the announcement, and maintain 
these excess inventories after the announcement. Consistent with the precautionary 
demand story (see. Kilian 2009), we show that this inventory accumulation behavior is due 
to an increased uncertainty induced by the OPEC meetings independent of the current 
market conditions. On average, cumulative abnormal inventories increased by 2.9% before 
the event and continues to maintain at that level after the event. In the hedging market, we 
show evidence that hedgers increase their crude oil short positions by 4% during periods 
of possible OPEC production increases. 
Keywords: OPEC, Crude oil Futures, FPCA, Inventory, Hedging Demand 
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1. Introduction 
For the first time since 2008, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
agreed to a crude oil production quota on the 30th November 2016. The decision to cap 
production under 32.5 million barrels per day came after a two-years oil price slump 
reportedly to be caused by OPEC’s strategy to flood the market with excess supply to 
compete with the US shale players for more market share. This historical event then 
reopens an age-old debate of the role OPEC plays in the energy market. In particular, 
whether the decision about the production level, implemented through a quota system, has 
an impact on the price of oil. For some, they found no significant effect on crude oil prices 
(see (Guidi, Russell and Tarbert 2006) and (Lin and Tamvakis 2010)), but suggest that 
OPEC meetings are on the headline news only during periods of high oil prices but lost 
their luster as price tumbles. For others, they found some significant crude oil price 
movements around OPEC meetings when they partition the data into “good” and “bad” 
times (see (Hyndman 2008) and (Deaves & Krinsky, The Behavior of Oil Futures Returns 
Around OPEC Conferences, 1992) or differentiate the meetings by the quota decision 
outcomes, cut, increase or maintain (see (Wirl and Kujundzic 2004) and (Loutia, Mellios 
and Andriosopoulos 2016)). In general, the current evidence on whether OPEC can impact 
the crude oil market is still mixed and remains an open question. 
In this paper, we revisit this age-old research question and examine the impact of OPEC 
announcements on the crude oil market but from another angle: How OPEC production 
quota announcements affect an investor’s optimal storage decisions? In particular, we show 
evidence that investors increase their crude oil inventories before the announcement, and 
maintain these excess inventories after the announcement. Consistent with the 
precautionary demand story (see. (Kilian 2009)), we show that this inventory accumulation 
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behavior is due to an increased uncertainty induced by the OPEC meetings independent of 
the current market conditions, i.e. whether the crude oil market is in contango or 
backwardation. On average, cumulative abnormal inventories increased by 2.9% before the 
event and continues to maintain at that level after the event. As for the hedging market, we 
show evidence that hedgers increase their crude oil short positions by 4% during periods 
of “bad” OPEC news. 
Our work complement existing literature on whether OPEC production quota 
announcements disrupt the crude oil market, and whether their actions have a significant 
economic impact on the energy market’s supply and demand dynamics, and the financial 
markets. Using an event study method, (Draper 1984) investigate whether the OPEC oil 
decontrol meeting of 1979 affects heating oil futures return during 1978 to 1990. He found 
positive abnormal returns before the meeting and negative abnormal returns after the 
meeting, suggesting that investors had anticipated the meeting results before it took place. 
In another recent paper, (Lin and Tamvakis 2010) extend the study and investigate the 
effects of OPEC announcements from 1982 to 2008. They include both the official 
conferences and ministerial meetings, and different grades of crude oil spot prices. 
However, they found that OPEC announcements have weak or no significant effects on 
crude oil prices. Also, they concluded that OPEC announcements are not exogenous but a 
function of oil prices by citing that during high oil prices, every OPEC meeting was on the 
headline news but as the oil price tumbles, OPEC meetings lost their luster. Mixed evidence 
and inconclusive is not uncommon in OPEC related literature. For example in 
(Schmidbauer and Rösch 2012), they find that oil price returns decrease after a production 
cut announcement and increase after a production maintain and increase announcement. 
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The mixed results are mainly because the magnitude of information surprises in the OPEC 
announcements is hard to quantify. For example, to investigate the impact of the Federal 
Open Market Committee (FOMC) scheduled meetings, we can measure market 
expectations using the implied interest rate from the Federal fund's futures traded at the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) (see (Bernile, Hu and Tang. 2016)). However, for 
OPEC scheduled meetings, ex-ante, we are unable to determine the market expectations of 
the OPEC’s level of production quota. Therefore, categorizing events base on just the 
change in production quota would only add more noise to the tests.  
(Deaves & Krinsky, The Behavior of Oil Futures Returns Around OPEC Conferences, 
1992) approach to this market expectation problem by ex-post categorizing each OPEC 
meeting announcements into “good” and “bad” news base on the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) value one day after the event. A positive CAR would then be considered 
“Good” news while a negative CAR would then be considered “Bad” news. Using this 
method, they found that investors underreact to “Good” news and the abnormal CAR can 
be earned up to 10 days after the event date. (Hyndman 2008) shows that production cuts 
lead to positive and significant CAR, maintain decisions lead to significant negative CAR, 
and no significant CAR was found for increase decisions. They proposed a bargaining 
model suggesting that during “Good” times, OPEC will always increase production while 
in “Bad” times, OPEC would want to cut production but faces a challenge to bargain with 
fellow members. This implies that increase production decisions are on average anticipated 
while cut decisions are almost surely a surprise. Therefore, event studies that used OPEC 
announcements date as the event date will be able to find CAR only for production cut 
decisions. This result is consistent with the results found in (Demirer and Kutan 2010). 
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Investigating crude oil spot and futures price around OPEC and Strategic Petroleum 
Reserve (SPR) announcements, and using an ARCH model as the benchmark model to 
compute the CAR, only the production cut announcement leads to significant positive 
abnormal returns with post announcement drifts. Motivated by the fact that price volatility 
increases during events,  by controlling for changes in volatility using an ARCH or 
GARCH model should help in improving the significance of the test. Recently, (Loutia, 
Mellios and Andriosopoulos 2016) also show that oil price CAR increases after production 
cut and remain announcements while it decreases after a production increase. Unlike 
(Demirer and Kutan 2010), they used an EGARCH model to estimate abnormal returns 
instead of the ARCH model. They suggest that only OPEC member countries can intervene 
with market prices because they have the spare capacity to do so (non-OPEC producers 
almost always produce at full capacity). However, the OPEC countries’ diminishing spare 
capacity trend would then ultimately limits its ability to manipulate oil prices.  
Abnormal crude oil spot and futures returns are not the only economic impact OPEC 
announcements has onto the financial market. Price uncertainty induced by these meetings 
are also of concerns to academics. (Horan, Peterson and Mahar 2004) gave empirical 
evidence of crude oil implied volatility increasing before the meeting only to decrease after 
the meeting. Consistent with uncertainty resolved after the meeting explanation, this result 
is stronger when the meeting is for the Ministerial Monitoring Committee (MMC) meetings 
rather than the usual bi-annual OPEC meetings or extraordinary meetings. Connecting the 
evidence with results from (Deaves & Krinsky, The Behavior of Oil Futures Returns 
Around OPEC Conferences, 1992), this supports the volatility risk premium story where 
an investor is being compensated from holding a crude oil stock through the uncertain 
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OPEC meeting period in the form of abnormal returns. However, the abnormal returns can 
only be observed in conjunction with the meeting surprises. Therefore, abnormal returns 
from production cut decision and the volatility risk premium will add up while for a 
production increase decision, the opposite forces would then cancel the overall returns. 
(Wang, Wu and Yang 2008) on the other hand show that OPEC meetings do not have an 
impact on crude oil price realized volatility. 
Our test strategy relies on identifying true OPEC announcement surprises and after that 
matching these surprises with economic variables. To identify possible surprise dates, we 
use standard structural break tests for unknown breakpoints on crude oil futures data and 
search for possible break date around each pre-specified OPEC meeting date. If the new 
information is unexpected, we should be able to observe a structural break in the time-
series dynamics of the crude oil futures price. Using statistical test to identify a surprise 
allows one to objectively select possible event dates with the most information, reducing 
noise and increasing the power of our event study. The main caveat of this method is that 
we will not be able to say that the economic impact is true whenever OPEC held their 
meetings. However, at least condition on whenever an OPEC’s decision does affect the oil 
market, we do observe that investors store more crude oil inventories to tide over uncertain 
times.  
Section 2 gives a brief description of OPEC and the organisation. The method on how we 
identify these unknown event dates and the event study methodology is explained in section 
3. In section 4, data description are presented while the main results are discussed in section 
5. Lastly with the conclusion in section 6. 
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2. OPEC 
Crude Oil prices rallied weeks before the Doha meeting, on 17th April 2016, between major 
OPEC and non-OPEC countries only to plunged 6.7% to $37.7 a barrel for U.S. crude and 
6.9% to $40.14 a barrel for Brent the next day3. This was the observed reaction by the 
market after the announcement of OPEC failure to freeze oil production. Contrary to 
popular belief, evidence that OPEC meetings or announcements influencing oil prices are 
still inconclusive. OPEC conferences are held bi-annually (June and December), and a few 
weeks before each conference ministerial meetings are also held. Ministerial meetings 
usually consist of OPEC’s monitoring committee and some non-OPEC observers. 
Conference proposals and details are usually settled during these ministerial meetings 
before the OPEC bi-annual conferences. In addition to the bi-annual conferences, 
extraordinary conferences may be called whenever OPEC deems fit.  
Research into OPEC conferences and its impact on oil prices has a long history. By 
examining the correlation between OPEC policy changes and changes in spot oil for all 
meetings between 1974 to 1983, (Loderer 1984) show that OPEC has no impact on prices 
during the oil price increase of 1974-1980. However, during the oil price decrease of 1980 
to 1983, some ability to impact prices was shown. This result is consistent with similar 
work by (Draper 1984) who examine abnormal returns of heating oil futures from 1978 to 
1980 and conclude that investors seem to have anticipated the meeting results before the 
actual meeting took place4. These earlier papers also support the idea that OPEC can affect 
prices after the introduction of the quota system in April 1982 (see (Gülen 1996)). 
                                                          
3 http://www.wsj.com/articles/doha-draft-calls-for-oil-output-freeze-at-january-levels-until-october-
1460872822 
4 (Draper 1984) state that using the Wall Street Journal to assess the likelihood of OPEC consensus and its 
implications for subsequent price changes as a measure of market expectations, it is able to conclude that 
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As pointed out, the results in the earlier papers were not robust through time. Table 1 
tabulates some of the papers in the literature and organizes them base on their general 
empirical results. (Hyndman 2008) estimated the impact to be 10% for spot oil price and 
6% for an index of oil firms. He suggests that during “good times”, OPEC will always 
increase production and therefore anticipated, while during “bad times”, OPEC wants to 
cut production but faces challenges to bargain with fellow members and therefore the 
results are unanticipated. Similarly, (Wirl and Kujundzic 2004) show that an agreement on 
a price reduction takes on average 4.14 conference days while a price increase and a no-
change results take 3.56 and 2.11 days respectively.  (Loutia, Mellios and Andriosopoulos 
2016) suggest that since only OPEC have the spare capacity to intervene with market 
prices, an increase in production to capture more market share is a signal for the market 
that OPEC is gaining more market power resulting in higher future oil prices. On the other 
hand, if the increase in production is the result of diminishing spare capacity, then it limits 
its ability to manipulate oil prices. On the contrary, using modified dummy variables with 
GARCH modeling to estimate the impact of OPEC announcement, (Schmidbauer and 
Rösch 2012) finds that oil price return decrease after a production cut announcement. They 
cited reasons such as higher probability to “cheat” after the agreement and deviation from 
market expectations. 
CRUDE 
PRICE 
LEVEL 
CUT MAINTAIN INCREASE 
                                                          
in general market anticipated OPEC decisions correctly. However, this was later rebutted by (Deaves and 
Krinsky 1992) where he gives an example that on 2nd Feb 1985, The Economist headlined its report on 
Conference 75 “OPEC’s Final split comes another meeting closer” but the cumulative return exceeded 5% 
for the crude oil contract.   
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INCREASE 
(Loutia, Mellios and Andriosopoulos 
2016) Sample from 1991 to 2015, 
(Demirer and Kutan 2010) Sample 
from 1983 to 2008,  (Hyndman 2008) 
Sample from 1986 to 2002, (Guidi, 
Russell and Tarbert 2006) Sample 
from 1986 to 2004, (Wirl and 
Kujundzic 2004) Sample from 1984 
to 2001 
 
(Loutia, Mellios and 
Andriosopoulos 2016), 
(Schmidbauer and 
Rösch 2012)   
(Schmidbauer and 
Rösch 2012)   
NO 
CHANGE 
(Lin and Tamvakis 2010)  Sample 
from 1982 to 2000 
(Lin and Tamvakis 
2010), (Demirer and 
Kutan 2010)  
 
(Lin and Tamvakis 
2010), (Demirer and 
Kutan 2010), 
(Hyndman 2008), 
(Guidi, Russell and 
Tarbert 2006) 
 
DECREASE 
(Schmidbauer and Rösch 2012) 
Sample from 1986 to 2009 
(Hyndman 2008) (Loutia, Mellios and 
Andriosopoulos 
2016) 
Table 1 Papers result on the impact outcomes of OPEC on oil price 
In this paper, we attempt to fill the gap in the literature by investigating OPEC conference 
impact on real economic variables, the inventory storage market, and the hedging market. 
We also propose a new methodology to identify OPEC announcement surprises despite the 
lack of market expectation data. The novelty of using structural break test for unknown 
breakpoints allow us to identify surprises is new in the literature. Lastly, we extend the 
focus and investigate breaks in level, slope and curvature. 
3. Methodology 
In this section, we shall describe methods used in this paper. Following Chen, Lim and Yap 
(2018) methodology to test for unknown breakpoints in functional shape variables, we first 
extract the shape time-series information from the WTI crude oil futures curve. We denote 
these shape time-series variables the level, slope, and curvature variables. Second, 
condition on a known OPEC meeting date, we use standard structural break test for 
unknown breakpoint on for every shape variables to search for a possible break date around 
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this known OPEC meeting date. Last, we use an event study methodology to investigate 
investors inventory and hedging demands behavior around these newly found break dates. 
3.1 Estimating the shape parameters 
Analyzing the futures curve instead of just the spot price allows us to extract a lot more 
valuable information about the demand and supply dynamics of crude oil. For example, in 
the theory of normal backwardation, (Keynes 1923) hypothesis that forward prices should 
be below the expected spot price due to the hedging demands by producers. The difference 
between the expected spot price and forward prices will then the be premium paid by the 
producers to entice the speculators to take the opposite position. Therefore, the steepness 
of the backwardated futures curve slope is a measure of the amount of risk premium a 
speculator. Implicitly, the risk premium is a function of the excess demand for futures 
contracts by the producers. The larger the hedgers to speculators ratio, the larger the 
premium and therefore the steeper the negative slope.  
For the opposition phenomenon where the curve is in contango, theories such as the theory 
of storage ( (Working 1949)) or the reverse hedging demand arguments are often cited. The 
storage cost model postulate that the difference between the futures price and the current 
spot price is the cost of holding physical inventories. Therefore the gradient of the slope 
will then reflect the supply and demand dynamics of the physical storage market. In an 
oversupplied market, inventories are used to store excess supply of crude oil. Also, 
inventories also act as a buffer to reduce price volatilities (see (Deaton, On the behaviour 
of commodity prices 1992) and (Deaton, Competitive storage and commodity price 
dynamics 1996). As physical storage gets filled up faster than new storage is being built, 
the cost of storage will rise in a new storage market equilibrium, making it more expensive 
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to store a barrel of crude oil. Therefore, the increased in the positive slope of the crude oil 
futures curve should then reflect the increased cost of storage. The theory of normal 
backwardation, the theory of storage and hedging demands are just a few of the theories 
that suggest that the shape of the futures curve do contain valuable information about the 
crude oil market. 
Despite this, event studies on the effects of OPEC announcements primary focus on the 
crude oil spot price and volatility. Much of the recent literature in this area tends to focus 
on improving the methods to compute abnormal crude oil price returns and volatility (For 
example a recent paper by (Loutia, Mellios and Andriosopoulos 2016)) or different ways 
to categorize different regimes and subsets. We hypothesize that there is a possibility some 
OPEC announcements not only affect the crude oil spot price but instead, also affect the 
shape of the crude oil futures. To test for this type of effects, we first need to quantify the 
shape of the futures curve into measurable variables. This motivates us to use the functional 
principal component analysis technique to decompose the curve movements into smaller 
interpretable components. These smaller components will then allow us to quantify how 
the curve changes its shape through time, and in particular, where the information from 
OPEC meeting announcements caused a significant change in the shape of the futures 
curve. 
Functional principal components analysis (FPCA) is a functional extension of the popular 
principal components analysis. In this framework, the crude oil futures curve is assumed 
to follow the following model: 
ln 𝑃(𝑡, 𝜏) = 𝜇(𝜏) + 𝜆1
0.5𝑙𝑡𝜙1(𝜏) + 𝜆2
0.5𝑠𝑡𝜙2(𝜏) + 𝜆3
0.5𝑐𝑡𝜙3(𝜏) 
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Where 𝜇(𝜏) is the unconditional mean curve, 𝜆𝑘 is the 𝑘
𝑡ℎ eigenvalue corresponding to the 
𝑘𝑡ℎ eigenfunction 𝜙𝑘(𝜏). These functions are assumed to be contansts and therefore does 
not change through time. While the time-varying components are the 𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑡 and 𝑐𝑡 which 
we denote them as the level, slope and curvature shape variables. We then further assume 
that the mean of each shape variables to be 0 and are cross-sectionally uncorrelated with 
each other.  
Before decomposing the futures curve into its shape variables, we first estimate a functional 
spline representing the futures curve. In our paper, we choose to use B-spline estimated 
using a least-squares approximation to represent each futures curve as functions. Single 
value decomposition is then used to solve for each unknown FPCA variables. Since the 
estimated eigenfunctions are unique only up to the signs, we then have to define a set of 
rules to ensure that our solutions are unique. In particular, 𝜙𝑘(𝜏) =  𝜙𝑘(𝜏) if 𝜙𝑘(1) ≥ 0 
and 𝜙𝑘(𝜏) =  −𝜙𝑘(𝜏) if 𝜙𝑘(1) < 0. This definition implies when the shape variables are 
increasing, the price of the front contracts are increasing. The three shape variables are 
purposely named as the level, slope and curvature to better aid in the interpretation. 
 
Figure 9 shows the first three eigenfunctions estimated from the time-series of the WTI crude oil futures 
curve from 3rd January 1997 to 21st April 2017. 
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Figure 10 shows the impact of each principal component shocks onto the curve. The x-axis is the time-to-
maturity of the futures contract while the y-axis is the price of the futures curve in natural logarithm. The 
black line refers to the original unconditional mean futures curve while the blue like is its deviation after 
one standard deviation of positive factor shock is realized. The red line is its deviation after one standard 
deviation of negative factor shock is realized. 
Figure (1) shows the first three eigenfunctions of the crude oil futures curve if we estimate 
the functions using the whole sample period. Figure (2) on the other hand shows the 
perturbation analysis of the unconditional mean for each factor shock. From the 
perturbation graphs, we can have a one-to-one relationship between the movement of shape 
variables and the resulting movement of the futures curve. The black line refers to the 
original unconditional mean futures curve while the blue line is its deviation after one 
standard deviation of positive factor shock. The red line is its deviation after one standard 
deviation of negative factor shock. The following are the empirical interpretation of the 
shape variables. The “level” shifts the curve in a parallel manner. A positive shock will 
shift the curve upwards while negative shocks will shift the curve downwards. The “slope” 
rotates the curve about a point. A positive shock will rotate the curve clockwise while a 
negative shock will rotate the curve anti-clockwise. Lastly, “curvature” twists the curve in 
a manner such that a positive shock will rotate the near-term and long-term contracts 
upwards while rotating the mid-term contracts downwards. This form of movement will 
cause the curve to have a “hump” or a “ditch.” After that, we shall proceed to use the time-
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series of our estimated level, slope, and curvature to make an inference of how the shape 
of the futures curve change during the period around OPEC meetings.  
In this paper, we want to examine the time-series dynamics of the level, slope, and 
curvature around OPEC meetings. In particular, we want to test if there is exist a sudden 
change in the level, slope, and curvature around OPEC meetings. However, in the FPCA 
decomposition other than the shape variables we also have the mean curve 𝜇(𝜏), 
eigenfunctions 𝜙𝑘(𝜏) and the normalizing constant 𝜆𝑘. Suppose there is a structural break 
in the shape of the futures curve, we want to associate it with one of the time-varying shape 
variables and not any of the time-invariant functions. Therefore, our estimation strategy is 
to split the estimation windows into two parts. Condition on a OPEC meeting date, we 
define a 61 days window period centerred around the known OPEC meeting date. This 61 
days window period is the window where we will test whether any of the shape variables 
structurally break. The second part is the 125 days window prior to the testing window. 
This is the pre-estimation window where we estimate the time-invariant functions in FPCA. 
Using the estimated time-invariant functions, we then project the level, slope and curvature 
series in the 61 days window period. Therefore, by contruction, we assume that the time - 
invariant functions does not change in our testing window.  
In the appendix, we perform a robustness check on the out-of-sample performance of the 
shape variables and most importantly the assumptions of the time-invariant functions. We 
compare the estimated invariant functions using the 125 trading days sample and compare 
it against the in-sample estimation. Using the root-mean-squared error (RMSE) measure, 
we measure the out-of-sample forecast error. The average RMSE between using the 
window’s mean forward curve versus the whole sample period is on average 3%. The 
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RMSE of the level eigenfunction is between 0.2% to 0.8%, the slope eigenfunction is 
between 0.5% to 1%, and the curvature eigenfunction is between 1% to 2%. The small 
differences between the actual in-sample eigenfunction and the window’s eigenfunction 
suggest that the eigenfunction is locally constant and therefore stable within the event 
window.  
3.2 Estimating the unknown event date 
For each OPEC meetings, we conduct an unknown structural break test for each of the 
shape variables, namely the levels, slope, and curvature. Testing for an unknown break 
date instead of a known one is new in this literature but required. The content in OPEC 
announcements are well known to be either never believed by the market because of the 
frequent “cheating” behavior by member countries, or well leaked in advance from minister 
interviews with the media. The assumed “cheating” behavior by member countries usually 
lead to markets not reacting to production quota announcements during the actual OPEC 
meeting. Instead, sometimes the market would then react to the event when third-parties 
publish new information such as the monthly production figures or possibly found reasons 
why this time round that member country will not “cheat”. Reasons can be due to political 
unrest, labor protest, and many more.  
On the other hand, because of ministerial interviews or insider news, partial information is 
usually leaked before the actual meeting took place. As deciding on a production quota for 
each member countries may seem to be a complicated problem, but knowing the thoughts 
of some of the major oil-producing countries such as Saudi Arabia may be enough to move 
the markets. To make matters worst, these ministers do not exercise confidentially before 
the actual events but instead create news. From their perspective, these countries may be 
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playing a bargaining game before the meeting to maximize their quota. Therefore, to 
overcome this problem, we use the structural break test to search for the actual break date 
condition on if there is a break. If there is no break, we shall conclude that in the 61 days 
window, OPEC announcements did not affect the crude oil market. The 61 trading days 
window is chosen arbitrarily. If we use a too small of a window, the structural break test 
may lose power and not reject the null hypothesis of no break when there is a break. If we 
use a larger window, it will be difficult to argue that the break is related to the OPEC 
announcements. 
In this paper, similar to Chen, Lim, and Yap (2018), we adopt the (Davis 1995) structural 
break test for AR(1) process variables. Using this testing strategy, we can test whether there 
is a break in the curve by testing whether there is a change in any of the shape parameters. 
In practice, the test can be used to test for any AR(p) process but chose to test assuming an 
AR(1) for simplicity. Let {𝑋𝑖}𝑖=1
𝑛  be n consecutive observations from the AR(1) model: 
𝑋𝑡 = 𝜙0 + 𝜙1𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡     − ∞ < 𝑡 ≤ 𝜏, 
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡      𝑡 ≥ 𝜏 + 1 
We compute the Gaussian Likelihood ratio, conditional on the first 𝑝 observations, 
Λ𝑛(𝑘) ≡ −2 ln (
𝐿(𝑛)
𝐿(𝑘)
) 
Theorem 1  
Under 𝐻0, 
𝑃 [
𝜎−2Λ𝑛 − 𝑏𝑛(2)
𝑎𝑛(2)
≤ 𝑥] → exp (−2𝑒−
𝑥
2) 
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Where Λ𝑛 = max
1<𝑘≤𝑛
Λ𝑛(𝑘) is the likelihood ratio statistic, 𝑏𝑛(2) =
(2 ln ln 𝑛+ln ln 𝑛−ln Γ(1))2
2 ln ln 𝑛
 
and 𝑎𝑛(2) = √
𝑏𝑛(2)
2 ln ln 𝑛
 are the normalizing constants and Γ(𝑥) is the gamma function. 
The probability density function can be written as, 
𝜎−2Λ𝑛 − 𝑏𝑛(2)
𝑎𝑛(2)
→𝑑
1
2
exp(−𝑧 − 𝑒−𝑧)  
where 𝑧 =
𝑥−𝜇
𝛽
. This is a Gumbel distribution with the location parameter 𝜇 = 2 ln 2 and 
the scale parameter 𝛽 = 2.   
3.3 Event Study Methodology  
We use an event study methodology to investigate the effects of OPEC announcements on 
economic variables. Event study methodology has been widely applied to many fields of 
financial economics. The event date used in the paper is the estimated unknown break dates 
instead of the usual OPEC announcement date. Note that if there is no information leakage 
and the announcement is a surprise, the estimated unknown break date should coincide 
with the announcement date. We opt for an event window of 10 trading weeks before and 
after the event date. This window period is again arbitrary. The choice is based on the 
consideration to capture time-series movement of the economic variables before and after 
the event date and to prevent overlapping with another event date to minimize information 
contaminations. We define the abnormal inventory growth rate and abnormal hedging 
pressure as: 
𝐴𝑅𝑡 = 𝑅𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑡] 
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Where 𝑅𝑡 can be the inventory growth rate or hedging demand. The lack of a market model 
lead us to use the constant mean model ( (Guidi, Russell and Tarbert 2006) and (Lin and 
Tamvakis 2010)) to estimate 𝐸[𝑅𝑡]. The constant mean is than estimated using a pre-
window period of 50 trading weeks before the event window. Using a market model instead 
of a constant mean model tend to have better results because of the variance reduction of 
the abnormal growth rate (See (MacKinlay 1997)) Therefore, any significant results from 
this event study is relatively more conservative and robust. The cumulative abnormal rate 
would then be: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑡
−10
 
For 𝑡 = −10, −9, … ,0, … ,10. The Patell 1976 test is used to determine if the cumulative 
abnormal rate is significantly different from 0. The Patell-Z statistics follows the standard 
normal distribution. For robustness, we also compute the bootstrap 95% confidence 
interval of the mean with 2000 repetitions. This event study is repeated for the levels, slope 
and curvature breaks. In addition, we subsets the breaks into positive breaks and negative 
breaks. A positive break is one in which the shape variable is higher after the break point 
while a negative break is one in which it is lower.  
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics  
In this section, we give a brief description of the data that we will be using in the paper. 
They are the crude oil futures, crude oil inventories, the hedging pressure measure and the 
actual OPEC announcement dates. Finally, we conclude this section with the summary 
statistics of the variables we are investigating.   
4.1 Crude Oil Futures  
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The crude oil futures prices used in this paper is the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude 
oil futures 
Figure 11 plots the time-series of the WTI crude oil futures spot price in our sample period. It covers some 
of the major oil price fluctuations, for example, Saudi Arabia 1986 increased production, the 1990 Kuwait 
War, the 2001 Iraq War, the 2008 financial crisis and the 2011 Libyan civil war. 
traded on New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), now part of the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (CME) Group. Daily futures prices for all the available contract maturities from 
30th March 1983 to 24th August 2017 are obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. In 
total, our sample would consist of 8972 trading days and spanning over 35 years. Our study 
required a long history to overlap with as much OPEC meetings as possible. The WTI 
crude oil futures price serve as a benchmark or reference price for the crude oil market 
globally. The WTI crude oil futures underlying is the physical WTI crude oil trading in 
Cushing, Oklahoma. However, the underlying spot prices are usually not publicly available 
as they tend to be traded over-the-counter. Instead, the market convention is to reference 
the price of the nearest-maturity month futures price as the spot price for WTI crude oil. 
For every trading day, we are only able to observe discrete points on the WTI futures curve. 
Only monthly contracts up to 5 years forward are available for trading and therefore 
observable. The WTI futures contract is one of the most traded and therefore most liquid 
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financial product in the world. This is important as our test critically make use of the 
assumption that the crude oil futures market is the most informationally efficient market, 
and therefore any event induced information should be reflected in the futures price curve.    
4.2 Crude oil Inventories 
Given the lack of a global crude oil inventories data, we follow (Kilian and Murphy, The 
role of inventories and speculative trading in the global market for crude oil 2014) and 
(Hamilton 2009) in using the data for U.S. crude oil inventories provided by the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration (EIA). In particular, we use the weekly commercial 
crude oil stocks excluding Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) as a proxy from 20th August 
1982 to 2nd March 2018. The inventory data variables refer to the week ending on Friday, 
but the report is only released the following week Thursday. For our paper, the inventory 
data date is the actual date and not the released date. As we are interested in the optimal 
storage behavior of investors rather than the information contains in the inventory data, 
any economic impact should be observed reflected on the actual date and not on the release 
date. If we are interested in observing investor’s reaction from the inventory storage 
information, then the release date will be the proper date to use. 
Figure 12 plots the time-series of the U.S. inventory levels from 20th August 1982 to 2nd March 2018. 
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4.3 Hedging Pressure 
The WTI crude oil and Heating Oil hedging pressure variables are derived using the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) reported Commitments of Traders 
(COT) breakdown of each Tuesday's open interest for futures from 15th January 1986 to 
27th December 2016. The COT reports 
 
Figure 13 plots the WTI and Heating Oil hedging pressure time-series from 15th January 1986 to 27th December 2016. 
The red series is the Heating Oil while the blue series is the WTI crude oil. A positive value implies that the hedging 
market is net short. 
are based on position data supplied by reporting firms such as brokers and clearing 
members. In articular, we are interested in the total position classified as a “commercial” 
trader. The assumption here is that trades by “commercial” trader has a higher probability 
to be for hedging purposes rather than for speculation.We compute the hedging pressure 
variables for each futures contract by measuring the net short position scared by the total 
number of hedgers position consistent with (De Roon 2000): 
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 − 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
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A positive number would imply that the futures hedging market is net short, Note that 
trading in the futures market is a zero-sum game. This means that for every long futures 
contract there is always someone taking the opposite position. However, using the 
definition of hedgers and speculators as the only two types of market participants, the 
counterparty of a long hedger need not be a hedger.  
4.4 OPEC Conference Meetings 
From the OPEC official press releases, we obtained OPEC conference dates from 29th 
October 1984 to 25th May 2017. There are in total 94 conference meeting consisting of 58 
ordinary meeting, 28 extraordinary Meetings, and 8 ministerial monitoring meetings which 
are included in our analysis. These meeting dates are known in advance and may last more 
than one day. In our paper, the OPEC announcement date is the end of the conference date 
whereby the OPEC secretary general will give his concluding remarks and the final 
production quota if any. We exclude OPEC meetings before 29th Octobers given that our 
crude oil and economic variables sample only begins after 20th August 1982.    
4.5 Summary Statistics 
 Sample Size Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Δ ln 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 1848 0.0124% 1.35% -0.082 3.14 
WTI HP 1426 4.95% 9.23% 0.506 2.99 
HO HP 1426 7.29% 7.94% 0.241 3.01 
Table 2 WTI HP and HO HP are the WTI crude oil and Heating oil hedging pressure measure respectively. 
A positive hedging pressure implies that the market is net short.  
Table 2 tabulates the summary statistics of the economic variables in the paper. They are 
the weekly inventory growth rates, WTI crude oil hedging pressure and Heating oil hedging 
pressure. The weekly inventory growth rates of 0.01% are small and insignificantly 
different from zero, suggesting that inventory levels tend not to grow in the long run. With 
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a standard deviation of 1.35%, an increase of more than 1.35% can be considered quite 
significant. A negative skew of −0.082 suggests that there are more inventory drawdowns 
than growth. The average WTI and Heating Oil hedging pressure is positive suggesting 
that on average the hedging market is net short. This is consistent with most empirical 
findings that support the theory of backwardation where producers are risk averse and are 
willing to pay a premium to protect them against a fall in price.   
5. Empirical Results 
In this section, we present the results for inventory growth and hedging demand around 
OPEC announcements. We investigate abnormal inventory growth, and abnormal hedging 
demand changes around level, slope and curvature breaks. Table 3, table 4, and table 5 
show the CARs for inventory growth, WTI hedging demand changes and HO hedging 
demand changes and their paths respectively. Also, we differentiate breaks into a positive 
and negative break. A positive break means that the shape variable increases after the 
breakpoint while a negative break means that the shape variable decreases after the 
breakpoint.  In this paper, we interpret a positive break for level as an unexpected increase 
in crude oil price for all contract maturities. A positive break for slope as an unexpected 
increase in crude oil price for nearby contracts relative to contracts with longer maturity 
dates. Lastly, a positive break for curvature as an unexpected increase in short and long 
maturity contracts relative to the medium maturity contracts. A negative break for the level, 
slope and curvature will then imply the opposite effects. 
Table 3 shows the impact OPEC announcements have on inventory growth. We found 
significant positive abnormal inventory growth for a positive level break. Abnormal 
accumulation of crude oil inventories begins 5 weeks,  reaching a high 1.9% CAR before 
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the break. Drawdown begins after the break till it reaches a 0% CAR at week 5. No 
significant result is found for the negative level break. A possible explanation is to that an 
investor is only able to anticipate OPEC news that is bullish for crude oil. The ability to 
anticipate allows them to accumulate inventories at a lower price before the news is made 
public only to sell them when the crude oil price appreciated. This type of strategy is 
usually carried out by speculators that have access to both the storage and financial 
markets. An interesting observation here is we do not find the opposite speculative 
behavior for a negative level break, if any, it is not significant. One possible explanation is 
the speculators do not anticipate a sudden price decrease due to an increase in OPEC’s 
production quota because the market expects that OPEC will always increase their 
production. In another word, there is a high tendency for member countries to “cheat,” and 
in the long-run, production levels by OPEC will always increase.  
For the positive slope break, we found an abnormal increase in inventory growth before 
the break. After the break, the abnormal increased in inventory did not drawdown. Our 
explanation is as follow: A positive slope break due to OPEC reducing supply will lead to 
a general drawdown of crude oil inventories. This is also true since spot prices are higher 
than future prices, incentivizing inventory holders to sell their stocks. However, the 
increased in spot prices comes together with increase future supply uncertainty induced by 
OPEC. The increased uncertainty will then increase the precautionary demand for crude 
oil. In the end, this will increase the abnormal level of inventory. From the figure 3 in table 
3, we can observe both the increase in abnormal inventories that do not go back to zero and 
the increase in the uncertainty after the break date. Abnormal Inventories levels increased 
by 2.2% to 2.9% before the break. We can interpret this as Inventories levels increased by 
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2.2% to 2.9% above the average drawdown rate or accumulation rate depending on the 
current market condition. This explanation is consistent with the precautionary demand 
story in (Kilian, Not All Oil Price Shocks are Alike: Disentangling Demand and Supply 
Shocks in the Crude Oil Maket 2009). Inventors are risk-averse and therefore have an 
incentive to increase their optimal storage level during high price volatility periods and 
decrease during low price volatility periods. The increased demand due to crude oil 
inventories also will also lead to an increase in the spot price for crude oil. Similarly, we 
do not see the opposite effect for the negative slope break. Curvature breaks due to OPEC 
announcements have no impact on inventories growth rate.   
Table 4 and table 5 shows the impact OPEC announcements have on WTI crude oil and 
Heating oil hedging demands respectively. For the WTI crude oil, we observe a permanent 
increase in hedging demands for the negative slope and curvature break. For the other 
breaks, the change in WTI hedging demand is not significantly different from zero. This is 
interesting because in this case, only the negative breaks displayed evidence of OPEC 
announcement impacts. An increase in hedging demands implies that hedgers demand to 
hedge the WTI crude oil price increases. A surprise increase in production observed from 
a negative slope break increases the demand for producers to hedge. Our empirical test 
suggests an economically significant 4.4% increase in hedging demand for negative slope 
breaks and a 4% increase in hedging demand for negative curvature breaks. It will be 
interesting to understand why the hedgers increased their positions during possible “bad” 
news but do not reduce their positions during possible “good” news from OPEC meetings. 
This could be evidence of the risk-averse behavior displayed by hedgers. For the heating 
oil, we observe a 7.6% abnormal increase in hedging demand before a positive level break. 
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This increased in hedging demand only decreased to 5% 10 weeks after the break date. On 
the contrary, abnormal heating oil hedging demand decrease by 3.3% to 5.2% after a 
negative level break. For the negative slope break, abnormal heating oil demand 
permanently increased by 3.5% to 4.2%. The remaining break have no significant impact 
on heating oil hedging demand. 
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Table 3 plots the cumulative inventory growth rates around the identified level, slope and curvature breaks 
conditioned on an OPEC announcement. Event Time 0 represents the estimated unknown break dates. + 
denotes a positive break while – denotes a negative break. Only significant abnormal inventory growth 
numbers are plotted. The shaded area is the bootstrap 95% confidence interval of the mean CAR using 
2000 repetitions. 
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Table 4 plots the cumulative abnormal change in WTI crude oil hedging demand around 
the identified level, slope and curvature breaks conditioned on an OPEC announcement. 
Event Time 0 represents the estimated unknown break dates. + denotes a positive break 
while – denotes a negative break. Only significant abnormal change in WTI crude oil 
hedging demand numbers are plotted. The shaded area is the bootstrap 95% confidence 
interval of the mean CAR using 2000 repetitions. 
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Table 5 plots the cumulative abnormal change in heating oil hedging demand around the 
identified level, slope and curvature breaks conditioned on an OPEC announcement. 
Event Time 0 represents the estimated unknown break dates. + denotes a positive break 
while – denotes a negative break. Only significant abnormal change in heating oil 
hedging demand numbers are plotted. The shaded area is the bootstrap 95% confidence 
interval of the mean CAR using 2000 repetitions. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we revisit this age-old research question and examine the impact of OPEC 
announcements on the crude oil market but from another angle: How OPEC production 
quota announcements affect an investor’s optimal storage decisions? In particular, we show 
evidence that investors increase their crude oil inventories before the announcement, and 
maintain these excess inventories after the announcement. Consistent with the 
precautionary demand story, we show that this inventory accumulation behavior is due to 
an increased uncertainty induced by the OPEC meetings independent of the current market 
conditions. On average, cumulative abnormal inventories increased by 2.9% before the 
event and continues to maintain at that level after the event. As for the hedging market, we 
show evidence that hedgers increase their crude oil short positions by 4% during periods 
of “bad” OPEC news. Our test strategy relies on identifying true OPEC announcement 
surprises and after that matching these surprises with economic variables. To identify 
possible surprise dates, we use standard structural break tests for unknown breakpoints on 
crude oil futures data and search for possible break date around each pre-specified OPEC 
meeting date. If the new information is unexpected, we should be able to observe a 
structural break in the time-series dynamics of the crude oil futures price. Using statistical 
test to identify a surprise allows one to objectively select possible event dates with the most 
information, reducing noise and increasing the power of our event study. The main caveat 
of this method is that we will not be able to say that the economic impact is true whenever 
OPEC held their meetings. However, at least condition on whenever an OPEC’s decision 
does affect the oil market, we do observe that investors store more crude oil inventories to 
tide over uncertain times.   
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Appendix 
1. Out-of-Sample Forecast of level, slope and curvature 
In this section, we shall analyse the out-of-sample performance of the mean forward curve 
(natural log forward curve). Below is the estimated root-mean-square-error (RMSE) of the 
learning window versus the whole sub-sample. The learning window is 125 trading days 
while the event window is 15 trading days before and after the announcement date. In total, 
the full sample period has 156 trading days (125 +31). 
 
Figure 14 The RMSE√𝐸 [𝑙𝑛
𝐹1
𝐹2
]
2
 is ≈
|𝐹2−𝐹1|
𝐹2
 which implies that the mean difference is approximately 3%. 
The shaded area is the bootstrap 95% confidence interval of the estimated mean.  
The mean difference between using the window’s mean forward curve versus the whole 
period is 3%. Similarly, we analyze the RMSE of the level, slope and curvature 
eigenfunction.  
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The RMSE of the level eigenfunction is between 0.2% to 0.8%, the slope eigenfunction is 
between 0.5% to 1%, and the curvature eigenfunction is between 1% to 2%. The small 
differences between the actual in-sample eigenfunction and the window’s eigenfunction 
suggest that the eigenfunction is locally constant and therefore stable within the event 
window.  
The following graphs show the similar analysis but with the event window increasing to 
20 trading days.  
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By increasing the event window by 5 trading days before and after the announcement 
date increases the RMSE of the mean curve to between 2% to 4%. The mean Level 
Eigenfunction RMSE increases slightly to between 0.5% to 1% from the previously 
reported 0.2 to 0.8%. The slope eigenfunction RMSE managed to maintain between 0.5% 
to 1.3% while the curvature eigenfunction RMSE stayed between 1% to 2%.  Therefore, 
the assumption of constant eigenfunction around the event window is plausible in our 
sample period. 
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2. OPEC Conference Meetings 
 
 
Conference 
Meeting 
Number Meeting No. Extra-ordinary
Ministerial 
momitoring 
committee
Date of 
announcement
Confirmation / retention 
of new allocation
Event Window 
Start
Event Window 
End
Change in 
production
4 71 1 0 29-Oct-84 1 29-Oct-84 4-Oct-85 -1470
5 75 1 0 4-Oct-85 1 4-Oct-85 25-Jun-86 0
6 78 0 0 25-Jun-86 0 25-Jun-86 28-Jul-86 0
7 28-Jul-86 1 28-Jul-86 6-Oct-86 0
9 79 1 0 6-Oct-86 0 6-Oct-86 11-Dec-86 -1100
11 80 0 0 11-Dec-86 0 11-Dec-86 25-Jun-87 780
13 81 0 0 25-Jun-87 0 25-Jun-87 9-Dec-87 782
15 82 0 0 9-Dec-87 0 9-Dec-87 21-Nov-88 -1540
17 84 0 0 21-Nov-88 0 21-Nov-88 5-Jun-89 3424
19 85 0 0 5-Jun-89 0 5-Jun-89 23-Sep-89 979
21 3 0 1 23-Sep-89 0 23-Sep-89 25-Nov-89 979
23 86 0 0 25-Nov-89 0 25-Nov-89 26-Jul-90 1554
25 87 0 0 26-Jul-90 0 26-Jul-90 26-Aug-90 405
26 0 1 26-Aug-90 1 26-Aug-90 12-Dec-90 0
27 88 0 0 12-Dec-90 1 12-Dec-90 11-Mar-91 0
28 0 1 11-Mar-91 0 11-Mar-91 4-Jun-91 -281
29 89 0 0 4-Jun-91 1 4-Jun-91 24-Sep-91 0
30 0 1 24-Sep-91 0 24-Sep-91 26-Nov-91 1910
31 90 0 0 26-Nov-91 1 26-Nov-91 12-Feb-92 0
32 0 1 12-Feb-92 0 12-Feb-92 21-May-92 -1214
33 91 0 0 21-May-92 1 21-May-92 16-Sep-92 0
34 0 1 16-Sep-92 0 16-Sep-92 25-Nov-92 1764
36 92 0 0 25-Nov-92 0 25-Nov-92 13-Feb-93 89
38 0 1 13-Feb-93 0 13-Feb-93 8-Jun-93 -988
39 93 0 0 8-Jun-93 1 8-Jun-93 25-Sep-93 0
40 94 1 0 25-Sep-93 0 25-Sep-93 25-Mar-94 932
41 0 1 25-Mar-94 1 25-Mar-94 21-Nov-94 0
42 97 0 0 21-Nov-94 1 21-Nov-94 19-Jun-95 0
43 98 0 0 19-Jun-95 1 19-Jun-95 21-Nov-95 0
44 99 0 0 21-Nov-95 1 21-Nov-95 5-Jun-96 0
45 100 0 0 5-Jun-96 0 5-Jun-96 27-Nov-96 800
46 101 0 0 27-Nov-96 1 27-Nov-96 25-Jun-97 0
47 102 0 0 25-Jun-97 1 25-Jun-97 26-Nov-97 0
48 103 0 0 26-Nov-97 0 26-Nov-97 30-Mar-98 2467
50 104 1 0 30-Mar-98 0 30-Mar-98 24-Jun-98 -1758
51 0 0 24-Jun-98 0 24-Jun-98 23-Mar-99 -1355
52 107 0 0 23-Mar-99 0 23-Mar-99 22-Sep-99 -1411
53 108 0 0 22-Sep-99 1 22-Sep-99 27-Mar-00 0
54 109 0 0 27-Mar-00 0 27-Mar-00 21-Jun-00 -1907
56 110 1 0 21-Jun-00 0 21-Jun-00 10-Sep-00 4331
57 111 0 0 10-Sep-00 0 10-Sep-00 17-Jan-01 800
59 113 1 0 17-Jan-01 0 17-Jan-01 16-Mar-01 -1499
60 114 0 0 16-Mar-01 0 16-Mar-01 5-Jun-01 -1000
61 115 1 0 5-Jun-01 1 5-Jun-01 3-Jul-01 0
62 116 1 0 3-Jul-01 1 3-Jul-01 25-Jul-01 0
63 117 0 0 25-Jul-01 0 25-Jul-01 26-Sep-01 -1000
64 0 0 26-Sep-01 1 26-Sep-01 14-Nov-01 0
65 118 1 0 14-Nov-01 0 14-Nov-01 28-Dec-01 -1501
66 0 0 28-Dec-01 1 28-Dec-01 15-Mar-02 0
67 119 1 0 15-Mar-02 1 15-Mar-02 26-Jun-02 0
68 120 1 0 26-Jun-02 1 26-Jun-02 19-Sep-02 0
69 121 1 0 19-Sep-02 1 19-Sep-02 12-Dec-02 0
70 122 1 0 12-Dec-02 0 12-Dec-02 12-Jan-03 1300
71 123 1 0 12-Jan-03 0 12-Jan-03 11-Mar-03 1500
72 124 0 0 11-Mar-03 1 11-Mar-03 24-Apr-03 0
73 0 0 24-Apr-03 0 24-Apr-03 11-Jun-03 900
74 125 1 0 11-Jun-03 1 11-Jun-03 31-Jul-03 0
75 126 1 0 31-Jul-03 1 31-Jul-03 24-Sep-03 0
76 127 0 0 24-Sep-03 0 24-Sep-03 4-Dec-03 -900
77 128 1 0 4-Dec-03 1 4-Dec-03 10-Feb-04 0
78 129 1 0 10-Feb-04 0 10-Feb-04 31-Mar-04 -1000
79 130 0 0 31-Mar-04 1 31-Mar-04 3-Jun-04 0
80 131 1 0 3-Jun-04 0 3-Jun-04 15-Sep-04 2500
81 132 0 0 15-Sep-04 0 15-Sep-04 10-Dec-04 1000
82 133 1 0 10-Dec-04 1 10-Dec-04 30-Jan-05 0
83 134 1 0 30-Jan-05 1 30-Jan-05 16-Mar-05 0
84 135 0 0 16-Mar-05 0 16-Mar-05 15-Jun-05 500
85 136 1 0 15-Jun-05 0 15-Jun-05 20-Sep-05 500
86 137 0 0 20-Sep-05 1 20-Sep-05 12-Dec-05 0
87 138 0 0 12-Dec-05 1 12-Dec-05 31-Jan-06 0
88 139 0 0 31-Jan-06 1 31-Jan-06 8-Mar-06 0
89 140 0 0 8-Mar-06 1 8-Mar-06 1-Jun-06 0
90 141 0 0 1-Jun-06 1 1-Jun-06 19-Oct-06 0
91 0 0 19-Oct-06 0 19-Oct-06 14-Dec-06 -1700
92 143 1 0 14-Dec-06 0 14-Dec-06 11-Sep-07 -500
93 145 0 0 11-Sep-07 0 11-Sep-07 5-Dec-07 1453
94 146 1 0 5-Dec-07 1 5-Dec-07 9-Sep-08 0
95 149 0 9-Sep-08 1 9-Sep-08 24-Oct-08 0
96 150 1 0 24-Oct-08 0 24-Oct-08 17-Dec-08 -1500
97 151 1 0 17-Dec-08 0 17-Dec-08 14-Dec-11 -4200
98 160 0 0 14-Dec-11 0 14-Dec-11 14-Jun-12 0
99 161 0 0 14-Jun-12 0 14-Jun-12 12-Dec-12 0
100 162 0 0 12-Dec-12 0 12-Dec-12 31-May-13 0
101 163 0 0 31-May-13 0 31-May-13 4-Dec-13 0
102 164 0 0 4-Dec-13 0 4-Dec-13 11-Jun-14 0
103 165 0 0 11-Jun-14 0 11-Jun-14 27-Nov-14 0
104 166 0 0 27-Nov-14 0 27-Nov-14 5-Jun-15 0
105 167 0 0 5-Jun-15 0 5-Jun-15 4-Dec-15 0
106 168 0 0 4-Dec-15 0 4-Dec-15 2-Jun-16 0
107 169 0 0 2-Jun-16 0 2-Jun-16 28-Sep-16 0
108 170 1 0 28-Sep-16 0 28-Sep-16 30-Nov-16 0
109 171 0 0 30-Nov-16 0 30-Nov-16 25-May-17 -1200
110 172 0 0 25-May-17 0 25-May-17
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Chapter 3: 
Understanding the Fundamentals of Freight Markets Volatility 
Abstract: 
Freight rates are highly volatile, and both over time and cross-sectionally, the causes of 
volatility are not so clearly understood. We analyse empirically the drivers of freight 
market volatility by considering a number of macroeconomic and shipping-related factors 
that are known to affect the supply and demand for shipping. Specifically we examine their 
impact on forward freight agreement (FFA) option implied volatilities (IV) of different 
maturities for Capesize and Panamax vessels. We find that the level of IVs is affected by 
the spot FFA rate, the slope of the forward curve, as well as by both demand and supply 
economic factors, especially the former. We also find differences in the impact of these 
factors on short-term versus longer-term implied volatilities. Panel regression produces 
strong validation of the results based on separate Capesize and Panamax regressions. There 
is a very interesting and novel finding that the FFA term structure slope has a bilinear 
impact on IV. In general anticipation of economic growth and higher future spot freight 
prices reduce IV whereas higher uncertainty, anticipation of excess shipping capacity may 
increase IV. For the academic community we investigate for the first time the impact of 
fundamental factors on freight rate volatility and thus provide further intuition on the 
mechanics of freight rate volatility. For practitioners, this study is important to discover 
what are the fundamentals used by expert brokers on the Baltic Exchange in shaping their 
assessments on the indicative option prices. Our results also demonstrate an alternative 
way of obtaining volatility forecasts, which will be useful for the pricing of freight rate 
options.  
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1. Introduction 
Freight rates are among the most volatile asset classes. While the time series and cross-
section properties of freight rates and their volatility have been investigated extensively in 
the literature, the causes of volatility are less well understood. In this study, we analyse 
empirically the drivers of freight market volatility. We use several macroeconomic and 
shipping-related factors that are known to affect the supply and demand for shipping and 
examine their impact on the term structure of forward freight agreement (FFA) option 
implied volatilities (IV) for Capesize and Panamax vessels. 
The study of IV is a novel area in the shipping economics and finance literature. This is a 
forward-looking measure of volatility that is priced by the market. It is a risk-neutral 
volatility but is likely to coincide closely with actual physical volatility. Understanding IV 
better and being able to forecast it is critical in hedging decisions and in pricing freight 
options. Previous studies in the shipping literature used statistical models of volatility such 
as conditional heteroskadasticity models, which were based on past freight rates. See 
Kavussanos and Nomikos (2000), Lu, Marlow, and Wang (2008), and Dai, Hu, and 
Zhang (2015). The latter found significant volatility spillover effects across different 
vessel markets and across vessel prices and freight rates. Kavussanos (1996) examined 
volatility as a measure of risk in the dry-bulk ship market and found that time-charter rates 
were more volatile than spot rates, and small vessels were less risky than larger ones when 
spot rates were used. Chen, Meersman, and de Voorde (2010) investigated the 
interrelationships in daily returns and volatilities between Capesize and Panamax freight 
rates in major trading routes and found that the dynamics between the two markets changed 
across time on different trading routes. Nomikos (2009) and Tsouknidis (2016) studied 
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dynamic volatility spillovers using multivariate DCC-GARCH models. These papers 
would substantiate the idea of inter-connectivity between the Capesize and the Panamax 
classes and also indicated differences in these classes. 
Chen and Wang (2004) used the daily returns of three different types of bulk vessel and 
showed a significantly negative relation in terms of return and volatility and that the 
leverage effect on volatility was more significant in market downturns than in market 
upturns. This would suggest an inverse relationship between spot rate levels and the 
volatility of the freight rates. Xu, Yip and Marlow (2011) studied the relationship between 
the time-varying volatility of dry bulk freight rates and the change of the supply of fleet 
trading in dry bulk markets. They analyzed the relationship between freight rate volatility 
and fleet size growth and found that the change in fleet size positively affected freight rate 
volatility. They found a stronger effect in the larger ship classes. 
Alizadeh and Nomikos (2011) investigated the relationship between the dynamics of the 
term structure and time-varying volatility of shipping freight rates from 1992 to 2007 and 
found support for the argument that the volatility of freight rates was related to the shape 
of the term structure of the freight market.They found the relationship to be asymmetric in 
the sense that when the freight market was in backwardation, volatility was higher 
compared to periods when the market was in contango. Alizadeh (2013) also found that 
FFA price changes had a positive impact on trading volume, suggesting a momentum effect 
as higher capital gains encouraged more transactions. There was also evidence of a 
contemporaneous and positive relation between trading volume and volatility. Drobetz, 
Richter and Wambach (2012) suggested that macroeconomic factors should be 
incorporated into the conditional variance equations in models for studying freight rates. 
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The effect of macroeconomic variables on the price of option and hence also its volatility 
was also studied by Dorion (2016) in a Macroeconometric Garch model. 
All the above studies used historical estimates, rather than market-based estimates, of 
freight-rate volatility. In addition, none of these studies has actually looked at the 
determinants of volatility and how volatility varies with respect to fluctuations in supply 
and demand drivers.  As such, our aim is to undnerstand the drivers and fundamentals of 
freight rate volatility, and in so doing establish a stronger economic basis in forecasting a 
very useful input to the pricing and hedging of freight options. But more importantly, as in 
Kavussanos and Nomikos (2003) and Batchelor et al (2007) in examining if forward 
rates contain information about future spot rates, we examine the information contained in 
IV. 
We examine a range of supply and demand-related factors in our models. For supply 
factors, we use fleet size, fleet growth, orderbook, net contracting, vessel utilisation, freight 
market momentum, second-hand freight sales, and second-hand to new order ratio. For 
demand factors, we use variables that reflect world seaborne trade and world economic 
activity. These demand and supply factors affect freight prices and volatility in the 
Capesize and Panamax markets as the related goods are carried by dry bulk carriers in these 
two classes of ships. In addition, we also consider economy-wide financial conditions as 
well as as market conditions in the FFA market. We study a number of models in explaining 
the IV dynamics and it appears that the most significant predictive variables of monthly IV 
levels are its lagged value, spot freight rates, forward FFA rate curve (slope in particular), 
option market trading volume (number of contracts traded during the month), the VIX 
level, OECD industrial growth, China's industrial production growth, China's coking coal 
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import, and ship building new orders. These factors are particularly relevant for the larger 
class of Capesize ships. For the Panamax class, the various market, demand, and supply 
explanation variables produce the same impact as in the Capesize class, although the 
explanatory power is weaker in lower 𝑅2s. 
We find that crucially the implied volatility (IV) is inversely related to the level of spot 
rate, forms a V-shaped curve against the forward rate slopes, and appears to be directly 
affected by the trading volumes in the FFA freight market. The V-shaped observation is an 
interesting findings - it implies IV increases with a contango as well as with normal 
backwardation. We find IV to increase with supply drivers such as ship order book 
increases or ship stock growth; we suggest this could be related to the forward looking 
negative impact on spot price and hence inducing greater uncertainty for the ship owners 
and increasing the demand for hedging. The latter would push up put prices and increase 
at-the-money volatility. We find IV to decrease with demand drivers such as higher OECD 
industrial growth and increased sea-borne trade such as imports of iron ore and coking coal 
to PRC. Higher economic activity index and higher levels of contracting also appear to 
reduce IV. The higher certainty of profitability for shippers appear to have a calming effect 
on the hedge market with lower IV. We find higher VIX, proxying for higher economic 
uncertainty and investor fear, is related to a higher IV, though the statistical evidence on 
the latter is weak, and not as pervasive as suggested in Robe and Wallen (2016) for the 
crude oil market.   
We shall see that our study is one of the first to examine IV in some detail, and that our 
results are consistent with those of historical volatility. 
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The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we discuss the monthly data that are 
employed in this study. Section 3 contains the empirical results and discussion of the 
results. Section 4 employs a more limited set of weekly data to perform a robustness check 
on the results. In section 5 we improve the estimation and testing efficiency by performing 
a panel regression combining both Capesize and Panamax implied volatilities. We also use 
more demand and supply variables. As many of them are highly correlated, to avoid multi-
collinearity, we form principal components of the demand and supply factors as regressors 
and examine their impact on implied volatility. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
2. Freight and Economics Data 
The recent years have been characterized by high volatility in the freight market and a 
corresponding growth in the derivatives market for freight. Traditionally, this market has 
been used by players in the physical freight market, such as shipowners, operators and 
trading houses, to hedge their freight risks, though this is now changing rapidly with the 
increasing participation of investment banks and hedge funds. Market participants trade 
forward contracts on shipping freight rates, known as forward freight agreements (FFAs). 
These are contracts to settle the average spot freight rate over a specified period of time. 
FFA contracts also serve as the underlying asset for freight options. Freight options are 
negotiated over-the-counter (OTC) and subsequently cleared through a clearing house. The 
option market has gained popularity over the recent years, reaching an equivalent trading 
volume of 250 million tonnes for 2011 and an open interest of 150 million tonnes of cargo. 
Freight options belong to the wider family of Asian options. In general, Asian options 
provide a good defense against market manipulation of the underlying spot price prior to 
settlement, since the settlement price of the option is given by the average of the spot prices 
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over the trading days of the settlement month. Further, the average value is less exposed to 
extreme movements at maturity resulting in option prices which are lower than the prices 
of, otherwise identical, plain vanilla options. For these reasons Asian options are popular 
in thinly traded or highly volatile markets, such as the market for freight. 
Our econometric model employs monthly data from January 2008 to June 2017 since 
implied volatility assessments for earlier periods are not readily available in a continuous 
series. Monthly data is used in order to align the volatility dependent variables with market 
demand and supply variables as well as macroeconomic variables that are available 
typically only on a monthly basis.  
We focus on the Capesize and Panamax sectors as these are the most liquid sectors in the 
FFA and Options market and jointly account for more than 90\% of the total trading activity 
in the market. Our key dependent variables are the Baltic Option Assessments (BOA) 
published by the Baltic Exchange. These are market assessments of at-the-money option 
implied volatilities - i.e., options with strikes equal to the prevailing FFA rates - based on 
personal expert assessments of freight option brokers. As such, these are model-free 
estimates of volatility and are not directly derived from traded option prices. In this sense, 
this study is important to discover what are the fundamentals used by the expert brokers to 
provide indicative IVs and thus indicative freight option prices. In accordance with market 
practice, BOA is subsequently used as input in the option pricing model of Turnbull and 
Wakeman (1991) and Levy (1997) to produce approximate Asian option prices. For a 
description of those contracts and their characteristics please refer to Alizadeh and 
Nomikos (2009) and Nomikos et al. (2013). 
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BOA and the corresponding FFA and spot freight rates are collected from the Baltic 
Exchange. We consider BOA option volatilities with the following maturities: Current 
Month, the next three quarters (+1Q, +2Q and +3Q) and the next two calendar years (+1Y 
and +2Y). Each quarterly contract consists of three options that expire at the end of each 
month in the relevant quarter, whereas a calendar contract is a strip of twelve monthly 
options. The settlement prices of the options are given by the average spot rates over the 
trading days of the settlement month. For example, on 04 January 2014 the +1Q contract 
comprises three options which settle at the end of April, May, and June 2014; the first 
option is based on the average spot rate in April, the second corresponds to May and the 
third to June. We employ volatility assessments in both the Capesize and Panamax sectors 
pertaining to the various forward horizons or terms to maturity, including that of the current 
month.  
We examine a range of supply and demand-related factors in our models. For supply 
factors, we use fleet size, fleet growth, orderbook, net contracting, vessel utilisation rate, 
freight market momentum, second-hand freight sales, and second-hand to new order ratio. 
For demand factors, we use variables that reflect world seaborne trade and world economic 
activity. These factors are OECD industrial production, industry productivity of China, 
Chinese steel production, Chinese iron ore imports, Chinese coking coal imports, aggregate 
iron ore exports from from Australia and Brazil, Australian steam coal exports, Australian 
coking coal exports, total coking coal imports of Japan and South Korea, aggregate grain 
exports from USA, Canada, Australia, Argentina, and the EU, Chinese agricultural product 
imports, and Chinese minor bulk imports. These demand and supply factors affect freight 
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prices and volatility in the Capsize and Panamax markets as the related goods are carried 
by dry bulk carriers in these two classes of ships.  
For economy-wide financial conditions, we use the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
Volatility Index (VIX) to proxy for shocks to financial market's sentiment. Shocks to VIX 
are widely used to analyse the risk absorption capacity of financial institutions on asset 
markets. For example, Cheng et.al. (2015) found that hedgers and speculators in 
commodity markets adjusted their positions in response to changes in VIX. We also use 
freight market factors including the FFA current month freight rates or spot rates, the FFA 
term structure slope (forward rate at maturity of 2 quarters less current month FFA rate)5, 
and trading volume in the FFA market as a proxy of relative liquidity in the market. 
We also explore several other demand and supply factors. Most of these other demand 
factor variables are correlated; likewise are the additional supply factor variables. To 
mitigate this issue and to ensure multi-collinearity does not weaken the estimation and test 
results, we first perform a principal component analysis on the two sets of factors and use 
the key principal components as demand and supply factors in the IV regression. 
 The forward rate curve slope is constructed by taking the difference of current month rate 
from forward rate in the second quarter (+2Q). Other variations are also tried, though this 
slope representation appears to capture the most information on the term structure. 
For explanatory variables we consider the following which we classify as supply factors, 
demand factors and financial market factors. Supply and demand variables for freight are 
                                                          
5 Other maturities are used to construct various term structures though the 2 quarters forward yields the 
best forward information. 
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obtained from the Clarksons shipping database. The additional VIX (S&P 500 index 
volatility series) is obtained from the CME public source. The key data variables are 
elaborated below according to whether they are supply side factors, demand side factors, 
or financial market factors. In forming the variables names, when a quantity is associated 
with Capesize ships, C forms the first letter of the variable name. When a quantity is 
associated with Panamax ships, P forms the first letter of the variable name.  
Supply Factors: We consider the following variables which we believe act as supply 
shifters for the Capesize and Panamax sectors, respectively. Data are collected from 
Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network. 
 Fleet Growth (FLEETG): measures year-on-year percentage changes in the size of 
the fleet 
 Fleet Development (FLEETD): This measures the size of fleet in deadweight tonne 
and is thus a proxy for the fleet supply for the Capesize and Panamax sectors 
 Orderbook (ORDER): Vessels that are currently on order, expressed as a 
percentage relative to the current size of the fleet. This measures the overhang of 
total orderbook and thus reflects future increases in supply 
 Bulk Contracting (BULKC): Measures the total number of new contracts for 
building new vessels. We consider two different versions of this measure: 
Contracting in deadweight tonnage 
 Contracting (CONTR) is expressed as number of new vessels as percent of the fleet 
size  
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Demand Factors: Here we consider variables that reflect world seaborne trade and world 
economic activity and thus act as demand shifters. Data are collected from Clarksons 
Shipping Intelligence Network. 
 Industrial Production (OECD): Year-on-year changes by month in the industrial 
production of OECD countries 
 PRC Industrial Productivity (IPPRC): Year-on-year changes by month in the 
industrial productivity of PRC 
 China Steel Production (PRCSTEEL): measured in thousand tons 
 China Iron Ore imports (PRCIRON): measured in million tonnes 
 China Coal Imports (PRCCOKE): measured in thousand tonnes 
The last two factors are the two major commodities transported by Capesize and Panamax 
vessels and as China absorbs about 50\% of each, they are considered as reliable proxies 
of the demand parameters in shipping. 
Financial Market Factors 
 Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX): This is used to proxy for 
shocks to financial market's sentiment. Shocks to VIX are widely used to analyse 
the risk absorption capacity of financial institutions on asset markets. For instance, 
Cheng et al., (2015) find that hedgers and speculators in commodity markets adjust 
their positions in response to changes in VIX 
 FFA Curve Slope (SLOPE): We employ the FFA rates and its term structure slope 
using the +2Q (forward at maturity of two quarters) rate less the current month rate. 
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The slope term is a proxy for the relative balance of supply and demand over time 
(Kogan et al, 2009) 
 Trading Volume (VOL): We also use trading activity in the FFA market as a proxy 
for the relative liquidity in the market 
To set up the predictive regression and avoid endogeneity problem, we employ regressors 
that are lagged, so they are pre-determined information. We employ the FFA rates and its 
term structure slope using the +2Q (forward at maturity of two quarters) rate less the current 
month rate. In this case, since the FFA assessments are made at the same time as the option 
volatility assessments, and both are forward looking (and in a more fundamental sense, the 
underlying FFA rates determine the options price and hence the implied volatility), we use 
the FFA information variables reported on the same dates as the dependent volatility 
variables. 
Due to US market closing at a time which is night time in London, VIX is always lagged 
at least one day in calendar date. The different holidays in US where VIX is quoted and in 
London where the FFA rate and implied volatility assessments are reported implies that 
the lag could occasionally be up to 2 days. For the implied volatilities, the rollover to the 
next nearest contracts typically occur on the last day or next to last day of a month. Since 
the economics time series are typically reported as end of month data, we use implied 
volatility assessments on the first trading day of each month in the period January 2008 to 
June 2017.  
In this way, all the explanatory or predictive variables are lagged at least one day. Spot 
Baltic Capsize and Panamax index used are lagged a day as assessment information on spot 
and on implied volatility are not synchronous, and the same-date spot information may 
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occur after the IV information – to avoid this possibility, we use spot information on the 
previous day, i.e. at the last trading day of a month while implied volatilities information 
are on the first trading day of each month. The summary statistics for the data series are 
shown in Tables 1A, 1B, and 1C. 
[Tables 1A, 1B, 1C about here] 
The data series are first tested for unit roots using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
statistic (ADF test). Series with unit roots or are non-stationary are first-differenced. The 
variable PORDER is I(2). 
The means, medians, standard deviations, and other distributional characteristics, including 
the ADF p-values of all the regression variables are shown in the Tables 1A, 1B, and 1C. 
However, when the various variables including I(1) and I(0) variables are combined in a 
linear regression, they are checked to ensure co-integration in order to interpret the 
regression results and to ensure they are not spurious. 
3. Empirical Results 
The statistical correlations of the various dependent variables (IVs) and the predicting 
variables are shown in Tables 2A, 2B, 2C, and 2D as follows.  
[Tables 2A, 2B, 2C, 2D about here]  
In Table 2A we show the correlation matrix of the Capesize Options IV for different 
maturities up to two years and the Panamax Options IV for different maturities up to two 
years. Both the ship size categories have data covering the current month implied volatility, 
the first quarter or three months maturity IV, the second quarter or six months maturity IV, 
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the nine-months maturity IV, one-year maturity IV. and two-year maturity IV. The table 
shows that correlations between changes in IVs of the same ship category are slightly larger 
than correlations across different ship categories. Also, within each category, correlation is 
stronger when their maturities are closer. Across the two different categories, IVs with 
shorter maturities appear to correlate slightly more positively. 
In Tables 2B and 2C we show correlations of variables that are less than 0.8 in absolute 
magnitude. The correlation of change in bulk contracting (in deadweight ton) and 
contracting (as % of fleet size) is 0.96 or close to one in a pre-table investigation, indicating 
little difference in the two quantities. They are likely to capture about the same data. 
Therefore, to avoid the strong multi-collinearity and redundancy in information, 
particularly for the follow-up regression method of investigation. We drop CBULKC and 
PBULKC from future regressions but retain use of CCONTR and PCONTR. We also see 
that PRC steel production and PRC iron ore imports (their changes) have very high 
correlation of 0.87 in a pre-table investigation.  
To avoid similar multi-collinearity and redundancy in information, we drop PRCSTEEL 
variable and use PRCIRON instead. The PRCSTEEL is in a sense a direct derivative of 
how much iron is imported before how much steel can be produced. The argument that 
steel production amounts direct affects iron imports is more tenuous since more production 
can be due to usages of inventoried coal. Coal import however move closely with market 
and economic factors of about the same month and is thus a more direct determinant of 
freight options volatility. Again for a pre-table examination, the variables CFLEETD and 
CFLEETG, and also PFLEETD and PFLEETG are closely correlated at 0.52 to 0.54. 
Indeed, checking the levels, growth is approximately the growth rate of the increase in 
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development size of the fleet. Similarly we drop CFLEETD and PLEETD from future 
regressions.  
Most notable in Tables 2B and 2C for Capesize and Panamax carriers respectively, are the 
larger negative correlations between spot rates and forward rate slopes, between spot rates 
and iron imports to China, and between change in fleet growth and change in fleet order. 
The first observation has to do with the plausibility that higher (lower) current spot, which 
is much more volatility than future forward freight rates, induces a lower (higher) term 
structure slope. The second observation plausibly indicates lower (higher) shipment costs 
lead to higher (lower) iron ore imports to China for that month. It accords with the 
economics principle of the price elasticity of demand, noting the freight cost is part of cost 
price for China in buying iron from overseas. The third observation about the fleet variables 
indicate that when fresh monthly fleet growth increases (decreases) due to delivery from 
past orders, the immediate current need or behavioral response to order more is lower 
(higher). 
In Table 2D, correlation of the Capesize and Panamax market factors show very strong 
positive correlations. For example, CSPOT has a 0.96 correlation with PSPOT. CSLOPE 
has a 0.71 correlation with PSLOPE. CVOL has a 0.63 correlation with PVOL. Therefore, 
for regressions involving predicting and explaining the IV dependent variables in the two 
ship categories, we use only market factors pertaining to the respective ship categories and 
do not cross-utilize them due to their high correlations. Information contained in for 
example CSLOPE would likely already incorporate information in the different ship 
category variable PSLOPE, and vice-versa. 
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These design considerations lead to the setup of the regression models as seen in Tables 
3A, 3B, 3C, and 3D.  
[Tables 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D about here] 
The results using 7 different representative linear regression models in Tables 3A to 3D 
boil down to using the main explanatory variables of Lag IV, Spot rate, FFA slope, Trade 
Volume, OECD growth, PRC industrial production growth, PRC iron ore and coking coke 
imports, fleet growth, fleet order, and market conditions and uncertainties such as 
contracting and VIX. 
As seen in Table 3A, B, C, D involving regressions of dependent variables IVCCM, 
IVC1Q, IVPCM, and IVP1Q, Neg SLOPE coefficient is highly negatively significant. This 
implies that a backwardation would add to volatility increases. This is similar to the 
findings in Yaron et al (2009) in the oil futures market. Interestingly Table 3D indicates 
that in some cases, Pos SLOPE is also significantly positive. This would imply that a 
contango could also introduce added implied volatility. Alizadeh and Nomikos (2011) 
found a non-linear relationship between historical volatility and the forward curve. We 
suspect a simillar non-linear relationship exists in the implied volatility measure and seek 
to document this effect as follows. We form two new variables, Pos SLOPE = max ( 
SLOPE,0 ) and Neg SLOPE = min ( SLOPE,0 ). These variables replace SLOPE in Models 
3 onwards after SLOPE is utilized in Model 2. By decomposing the term structure slope 
into two separate explanatory variables that are orthogonal, then it is shown that in models 
3 to 7, IV increases with Pos Slope but decreases with Neg Slope. The Pos Slope effect is 
a surprise, indicating that when future FFA rates are expected to be positively high, current 
IV increases. The estimated negative coefficient on Neg Slope however implies that when 
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future FFA rates are expected to level up or increase, IV decreases. This V-shaped effect 
of term structure slope on IV is an interesting documentation - it implies IV increases with 
a contango as well as with normal backwardation.  
Spot rates are consistently negatively correlated with the IV as shown in the Tables. A 
strong implication is that when rates are low, and also when backwardation points to an 
expected future low rate, shippers would face greater uncertainties and there would be 
higher demand to hedge by purchase of put options. At the money puts would become 
highly priced and yield high IV. However, a higher spot rate and better economic 
certainties regarding future shipping profits in chartering and leasing would ensure 
calmness in the market and less IV. Implicitly there appears to be a case where if future 
demand seems to increase, freight capacity could catch up, so there would not be an 
anticipated huge excess shortage of shipping capacity resulting in high call prices and high 
volatility. 
We find IV to increase with supply drivers such as ship order book increases or ship stock 
growth; we suggest this could be related to the forward looking negative impact on spot 
price and hence inducing greater uncertainty for the ship owners and increasing the demand 
for hedging. The latter would push up put prices and increase at-the-money volatility. We 
find IV to decrease with demand drivers such as higher OECD industrial growth and 
increased sea-borne trade such as imports of iron ore and coking coal to PRC.  
In the regressions, it is shown that lagged IV (introduced on the RHS as the errors may be 
correlated), trading volumes, and to a less significant extent fleet orders (see Table 3D for 
Panamax) and VIX positively impact on IV. Higher economic activity or higher level of 
contracting also appears to reduce IV. The higher certainty of profitability for shippers 
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appears to have a calming effect on the hedge market with lower IV. We find higher VIX, 
proxying for higher economic uncertainty and investor fear, is related to a higher IV, 
though the statistical evidence on the latter is weak, and not as pervasive as suggested in 
Robe and Wallen (2016) for the crude oil market. Higher trading volume volume in the 
FFA market also indicates uncertainty more than the effect of liquidity and lower 
transactions costs -- the uncertainty increases the option prices and hence implied volatility. 
The last row in the Tables also report the ADF test and p-value on the fitted residuals as a 
check on cointegration in the regression should any of the variables contain unit roots. The 
ADF statistic clearly indicates all the regressions are co-integrated. The adjusted $R^2$ 
shows that Model 7 generally has the highest fitting or explanatory power although the 
differences between Models 4, 5, 6, and 7 are incrementally small. 
To enable a validation of the results, we perform regressions based on Model 7 on all the 
Capesize and Panamax IVs of varying maturities up to 2 years. These results are shown in 
Table 4. 
[Table 4 about here] 
In Table 4 we present all the regression results of model 7 of both the Capesize and the 
Panamax cases. From Table 4, clearly the predictive variables with the most significant 
impacts across the spectrum of IV maturities are the lagged IV, spot rates, negative slope 
or backwardation, trading volume, OECD growth, and PRC iron ore imports. Positive slope 
and fleet order appear to be significant in the Panamax IV cases. Across both classes of 
ships and across all option contract maturities, the implied volatilities show a clearly 
significant negative impact by the negative slope of the term structure of FFA. In other 
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words, reversion of backwardation toward contango can greatly reduce the IV. However, 
any further increase in contango or the slope of term structure when this becomes positive 
does not appear to further reduce IV, but may instead increase IV. This is significantly so 
in the Panamax first quarter option contracts. However, it is not significantly different from 
zero in the coefficient of the positive slope for most cases, and in the Capesize option with 
1-year maturity, the coefficient is negative.  
Table 4 also provides a comparison of how the factors affect the implied volatilities of 
different maturities. It is seen that the impact of the various demand and supply factors 
tended to be stronger and more significant for near-term volatilies such as in the current 
month up to a year. Distant 2=year forward looking volatilities are less affected by changes 
in the demand and supply variables. This could be due to the distant-time effect or due to 
anticipations of market corrections over cycles of a year. 
In all the regressions we employ the Newey-West Heteroskedasticity consistent estimators 
for the standard deviations in order to arrive at robust interpretations of the significance of 
the coefficient estimates. We find stronger results in the bigger Capesize ship IVs, but 
generally consistent and similar results in both the Capesize and the Panamax classes. 
4. Robustness Check 
In order to check for robustness in empirical results, we perform the regressions using 
weekly data. While the shipping prices, market factor and supply variables were available 
on a weekly basis, the macroeconomic demand variables were available only on monthly 
basis and had to be interpolated in order to obtain proxies for the weekly variables. In our 
sample period, we have a total of 488 weekly observations which in contrast to the 113 
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monthly observations. The literature typically picks Wednesday as the representative day 
of the week and employs data on Wednesday for weekly regression. This is to avoid the 
start of the week and end of the week trading pattern anomalies. Therefore dependent 
variables are obtained as implied volatilities on Wednesdays. The lagged FFA slope would 
then be obtained from Tuesday, the day before. The FFA slope was constructed the same 
way as in the monthly data by taking the difference of current FFA price from forward 
second quarter (+2Q) prices. Trading volume for the FFA market was obtained on Monday 
as this data is released every week on Monday. Lagged VIX and index spot prices were 
obtained based on Tuesdays. If a particular trading day is a public holiday, we used the 
previous trading day data instead. There were some missing data for spot price and trading 
volume for the last week of December every year. Thus the sample size is slightly smaller 
due to some omissions. Tables 5A, 5B, 5C, and 5D show weekly regression results 
corresponding to the monthly regression results reported in Tables 3A to 3D.  
[Tables 5A, 5B, 5C, 5D about here] 
We also perform weekly regressions based on Model 7 on all the Capesize and Panamax 
IVs of varying maturities up to 2 years. These results are shown in Table 6.  
[Table 6 about here] 
The regression results using weekly data, including intrapolated data of macroeconomic 
variables that are published only on a montly basis, indeed confirm the results using 
monthly regressions. In several cases the weekly results are even stronger with more 
significant coefficients. For example, trading volumes on a weekly basis appear to be more 
positively significant in explaining the weekly time series of IVs. The pos slope coefficient 
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in weekly regression is also positively significant at 10% level in all regression models of 
the Capesize FFA first quarter IV in Table 5B whereas it is not significant in Table 3B. 
Similarly, the negative coefficient of IPPRC is significant in Table 5A but not Table 3A, 
and the negative coefficient of PRC Coke import is significant in Table 5B but not Table 
3B. The results for both monthly and weekly data are almost similar; for example the 
significant pos slope coefficients in Table 3D remain so in Table 5D, except the 
significance or p-values are even smaller in the weekly regressions. The adjusted 𝑅2 of the 
weekly regressions are generally all higher except for only the cases of Panamax current 
month IV in Table 5C. The co-integration are even stronger in the weekly regressions as 
evidenced by the lower ADF estimates on the last row of each of the Tables. Model 7 
continues to be the one with the highest adjusted 𝑅2 or fit. 
Comparing the regression results in Table 6 versus those reported in Table 4, we see that 
almost all the signs of the coefficients are similar. For the estimated Pos Slope coefficient, 
5 cases out of 12 in the weekly regressions of Table 6 are significantly positive whereas 
only 2 cases are in Table 4. For weekly data, Fleet growth has many significant cases of 
positive impact on IV whereas for monthly data there is only one positively significant 
case. For weekly data, the import of PRC Coke shows up clearly as having significant 
negative impact on FFA volatility though the negative coefficient estimates are often less 
significant in the monthly regressions. Negative coefficients indicate the healthy business 
of freight business and hence lower implied volatility on the price of hedging using FFA 
options. 
The results show that there is a toss-up between the stronger results generally of using more 
data and higher frequency data and the accuracy costs with respect to interpolated monthly 
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data especially if more and more regressors rely on such interpolation using various 
possible methods. For the latter we find that our results are not sensitive to alternative 
interpolation methods. 
In addition to the key explanatory variables indicated in section 2, we consider also several 
other less direct or prominent demand and supply factor variables given available data and 
information in the dry bulk shipping market. These are Port Congestion: this reflects the 
congestion rate, being expressed as a percentage of the fleet; Utilisation: this reflects the 
utlisation rate of the current fleet and is expressed as a percent of the fleet employed at full 
capacity; Momentum: this measures the momentum in the freight market and is estimated 
as the cumulative 3-month return of the spot freight market; Sales: this measures the total 
number of second-hand sale & purchase transaction in the market and is thus a proxy for 
the relative state of the freight market; Second-Hand to Newbuilding ratio: it measures the 
ratio of Second-Hand to Newbuilding prices. In strong freight markets, second-hand 
vessels trade at a premium to newbuilding vessels due to their immediate delivery in the 
freight market, and thus this is similar to Tobin's q- ratio.  
For demand parameters in shipping, we also consider Aggregate Iron Ore Exports from 
Australia and Brazil, Australia Steam and Coking Coal Exports, Total Coking Coal Imports 
of Japan and South Korea, Aggregate Grain Exports from USA, Canada, Australia, 
Argentina and the EU, Chinese Agricultural Products Imports, and Chinese Minor Bulk 
Imports. The last three items are more relevant for the Panamax ships as they are the more 
typical carriers for those goods.  
However we do not find inclusion of these additional explanatory variables to the main 
ones explained in Tables 3A to 3D to yield any significant coefficients of themselves. Most 
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of these other demand factor variables are correlated as they tended to move with the 
general economic expansion or else contraction of the global economy. Supply variables 
such as port congestion and utilization rate tended to be positively correlated. To mitigate 
the issue of multi-collinearity which can considerably weaken the regression results, we 
first perform a principal component analysis on the two sets of demand and supply variable 
factors. The demand factor would be the first principal component of the matrix of demand 
variables including OECD, IPPRC, PRCSTEEL, PRCIRON, PRCCOKE, Aggregate Iron 
Ore Exports from Australia and Brazil, Australian Steam and Coking Coal Exports, Total 
Coking Coal Imports of Japan and South Korea, Aggregate Grain Exports from USA, 
Canada, Australia, Argentina and the EU, Chinese Agricultural Products Imports, and 
Chinese Minor Bulk Imports. The latter import and export variables create demands for 
shipping spaces to transport the bulk commodities across the oceans. The supply factor 
would be the first principal component of the matrix of supply variables including 
FLEETG, FLEETD, ORDER, BULKC, CONTR, Port Congestion, Utilisation, 
Momentum, Sales, and Second-Hand to Newbuilding prices.  
Instead of regressing supply and demand variables individually, in the section, we replace 
the individual variables with the first components or the single supply and demand 
diffusion indexes constructed using principal the component analysis. The other market 
variables as in the earlier regressions are kept. The results are reported in Tables 7A and 
7B. In Table 7A, 4 regressions are performed using dependent Capesize IVCCM in models 
1 to 4, and the other 4 regressions are performed using dependent Capesize IVC1Q for 
similar 4 models. Table 7B shows the same cases but involve Panamax ships. 
[Tables 7A, 7B about here] 
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The regression results show that lagged implied volatility, spot price, negative slope and 
trading volume remain significant in explaining future Implied Volatility. VIX is 
significantly positive in some maturities for the Panamax case. After adding the Supply 
and Demand diffusion indexes, we observe that only the Demand Index is statistically 
significant. The negative coefficient on the Demand Index suggests that when demand for 
freight increases, next period implied volatility decreases. This is the same effect of 
improved business conditions reducing market anxiety and hence less risk-hedging and 
less option IV. The results confirm and support our earlier regression model analyses. 
We also employ a large macroeconomic dataset available from McCracken and Ng 
(2015). The database is widely used for macroeconomic research and is known as the 
Stock-Watson dataset. The sample period data is available at a monthly frequency from 
1959/1 to 2017/7. For our purpose, we use the subsample period from 2007/12 to 2017/6 
to match our freight data period. We first transformed the data to stationary series using 
the transformation detailed in McCracken and Ng (2015). The sample is de-meaned and 
principal component analysis is applied on to the correlation matrix of the de-meaned 
sample data. The first eight estimated factors (principal component scores) are computed 
using the estimated weights (eigenvectors). The time-series of the first two factors are then 
used as additional variables in our regression models. However the results from adding 
these PCAs are clearly not significant, and so we do not report the regression numbers here. 
The key takeaway could be that macroeconomic variables in the broadest sense may impact 
more the broad equity markets than the more niched shipping markets, especially on option 
prices and volatilities. In any case, some of the macroeconomic effects would already be 
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fully captured in the supply, demand, and financial market variables that we employ as 
explanatory variables.  
5. More Efficient Estimation 
So far we have investigated the various demand, supply, and financial market factors that 
could potentially explain the FFA option volatilities. The regressions were done separately 
on Capezsize and Panamax ship IVs and on each IV with a different maturity. The results 
have been quite consistent across the different types of ships and across the different 
maturities. Using separate regressions, some information on the covariance of the 
innovations in each regression is lost. To capture this information, we perform a panel 
regression or a time-series cross-sectional regression in this situation. In the panel 
regression, we combine all the implied Volatilities of different maturities into one single 
vector regression. This is a stacked vector including IVs from the current month maturity, 
first-quarter maturity, second and third quarter maturities, the one-year and the two-year 
maturities of both categories of ships. Similar the stacked regressors involve the same 
explanatory variables used in Tables 3A to 3D. The panel regression controls for fixed ship 
category and fixed maturities. The results are reported in Table 8. 
[Table 8 about here] 
The results using the panel regression are much stronger, yielding the same explanations 
as we have seen earlier. In particular, the Pos Slope estimated coefficient is now highly 
significantly positive in every of the models. The Neg Slope estimated coefficient are 
significantly negative. Thus the V-shaped impact of term structure slope on implied 
volatility is established, and is a very important finding. In addition, the coefficient of VIX 
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is now significantly positive in all models. This confirms the role of VIX as a fear and 
anxiety index whereby its increase would lead to more hedging and buying of FFA options, 
driving up the implied volatilities. The demand side factors or variables such as OECD, 
IPPRC, PRC Coke import are clearly and significantly negative in lowering implied 
volatilities or the cost of hedging when business conditions are good and there is healthy 
trade. Of the supply factors, only Fleet Order has a significant positive impact on IV. 
Higher ship order would harbinger future over-supply of ship capacities and thus generate 
more uncertainty. So ceteris paribus, IV would increase. 
6. Conclusions 
Freight rates are highly volatile, and both over time and cross-sectionally, the causes of 
volatility are not so clearly understood. Conditionally dynamic statistically processes have 
been estimated in many studies on the past historical empirical FFA rates. Very few studies 
are on forward looking volatilities which can be obtained as implied volatilities from FFA 
options, although this is based on risk-neutral probabilities.  
We analyse empirically the drivers of such implied freight market volatility by considering 
a number of macroeconomic and shipping-related factors that are known to affect the 
supply and demand for shipping. Specifically we examine their impact on the forward 
freight agreement (FFA) option implied volatilities (IV) for Capesize and Panamax vessels 
across different maturities. We find that the level of IVs is affected by the spot FFA rate, 
the slope of the forward curve, as well as by both demand and supply economic factors. 
Demand factors are stronger in affecting the forward looking implied volatilities than 
supply factors. We also find differences in the impact of these factors on short-term versus 
longer-term implied volatilities. It is seen that the impact of the various demand and supply 
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factors tended to be stronger and more significant for near-term volatilities such as in the 
current month up to a year. Distant 2=year forward looking volatilities are less affected by 
changes in the demand and supply variables.  
In general anticipation of economic growth and higher future spot freight prices reduce IV 
whereas higher uncertainty, anticipation of excess shipping capacity may increase IV. A 
very interesting finding is that the implied volatility is impacted by the term structure slope 
of the FFA rates in a V-shaped nonlinear fashion. Thus when backwardation as well as 
contango increases in absolute slopes, the implied volatility also increases. This V-shaped 
phenomenon is fodder for more research. This should lead to better understanding of 
freight option pricing and how it could be related to structural and economic factors. For 
the academic community we investigate for the first time the impact of fundamental factors 
on freight rate volatility and thus provide further intuition on the mechanics of freight rate 
volatility. For practitioners, this study is important to discover what are the fundamentals 
used by expert brokers on the Baltic Exchange in shaping their assessments on the 
indicative option prices. Our results also demonstrate an alternative way of obtaining 
volatility forecasts, which will be useful for the pricing of freight rate options. 
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